Algeria’s President Abdelaziz Bouteflika is seen at the presidential palace in Algiers, in this file picture taken December 11, 2011. (REUTERS/Louafi Larbi/Files)

Algiers, Asharq Al-Awsat—President Abdulaziz Bouteflika’s recent mini-stroke, which resulted in him being flown to France for urgent medical treatment, has renewed the controversy surrounding the political future of the country, including the possible transition of power.

A significant number of Algerians are convinced that the president’s health will impede his chances of securing a fourth term in office at the forthcoming elections scheduled for spring 2014. Moreover, some politicians have started to suggest that there may even be a transition of power before the elections, given the intensifying controversy around Article 88 of the constitution, which asserts that the presidency be left vacant in the case of extreme illness.

Algerian decision-makers closely monitoring the situation in the country underscore that the president’s most recent ailment is one of several that he has suffered from in recent years, with the previous illnesses not being discussed publicly. However this time, the president’s office was quick to make an unprecedented official announcement, leading to a flood of speculation. Some believe that the president’s illness has undone his aspirations of securing a fourth term in power, while others think that it may actually present a campaigning opportunity. On his return from Paris, President Bouteflika will be greeted with much fanfare and celebrations where supporters will, no doubt, call for a fourth term. This could all set the stage for a run in the upcoming elections.

Speaking exclusively to Asharq Al-Awsat, Soufiane Djilali, president of the opposition Jil Jadid Party (New Generation Party) and leader of a group opposed to the nomination of Bouteflika for a fourth successive term, said that the president’s physical ailments prevent him from continuing to govern. He added that if Bouteflika truly does relinquish his grip on power, this would prevent the beneficiaries of his policies from continuing to loot the country’s wealth.

Djilali stated that Algeria now faces four possible scenarios.

He said, “The first [possible scenario] is the president recovering, which would allow him to continue to govern until the end of his term. He would then hold presidential elections and transfer power to someone else,” adding, “I think this is an unlikely scenario.”

“The second possible scenario is that the president would return to the helm of governance, but would announce early elections due to his poor health. The third scenario is that the president’s health condition remains the same, in which case the presidency will be announced as vacant and elections will be held in accordance with the constitution,” Djilali said.

The Algerian opposition leader emphasized that “the worst possible scenario would be that Bouteflika makes a full recovery and secures a fourth term for himself.”

The president has been in France since April 27 where he has been receiving treatment for a reported mini-stroke. According to the doctors who advised his family to move him to Paris for medical treatment, the stroke caused no permanent damage. Bouteflika is being treated at the same hospital where he underwent surgery in 2005.

Djilali clarified that he has been contemplating Bouteflika seeking a fourth presidential term in office since the news that he had flown to Paris for medical treatment, stressing that Bouteflika even standing for re-election would be disastrous for the country.

For months, Soufiane Djilali has led a campaign against the continuation of Bouteflika’s rule, launching a so-called Front Against the Fourth Term in coordination with former Prime Minister Ahmed Benbitour and revolutionary figure Mohamed Mechati.

Over the years, President Bouteflika and those around him have dealt with news regarding his health in a methodical manner, and every time there was public speculation about his health, he would appear on camera to deny the news. Those following the president’s illness have pointed to two events. The first was when the president was transferred to Ain Al Naaja Military Hospital in the capital to visit Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi who was also ill. Following this episode, rumors about the president’s death spread quickly.

The second incident was when he hosted the family of French Algerian soccer player Zinedine Zidane, along with his own two brothers Moustafa and Said, at the presidential residence at Janan Al Mufti. This time the rumors purported that both the president and his brother Moustafa had passed away. These rumors spread quickly and were not limited to Algeria. Just a few weeks later, the president’s brother Moustafa died of cancer.

In political and media circles, there is a nearly unanimous agreement that the political scandals which the pressed covered in the past involving the president’s brother and adviser Said have seriously affected Bouteflika psychologically and his already deteriorating health.

What makes this most recent incident remarkable is that this is the first time the authorities have officially revealed the nature of Bouteflika’s illness. At the end of 2005, for example, the president’s office issued a statement that Bouteflika had traveled to France for in-depth medical exams which revealed stomach bleeding; news that in turn sparked rumors that he had contracted cancer, which the authorities were quick to deny. Bouteflika’s medical file has remained a state secret for seven and a half years, but it has officially entered the public arena as rumors about his illness continue to fill the newspaper pages.

The announcement and official disclosure of the president’s illness have raised the controversial issue of succession and who is qualified to lead the country.

Anouar Malek, an Algerian political analyst living in France, told Asharq Al-Awsat: “President Bouteflika’s health is not good; this is a foregone conclusion. His health has been deteriorating since the surgery he underwent in France at the end of 2005. His health issues might end his plans to run for a fourth term, and therefore he must address this issue before the upcoming presidential elections scheduled for the spring of next year.”

Malek, a former military officer, added, “My guess is that Bouteflika will not step down because this would bring down many figures who benefit from his regime…and others who have partaken in corrupt practices during his [14 year] rule. Such widespread corruption was not present even during Chadli Bendjedid’s presidency (1979-1992), which was characterized by rampant corruption. The same goes for the Red Decade, during which the Algerian people’s only concerns were to save their own necks.”

The ‘Red Decade’ in Algeria refers to the 1990s when terrorism claimed more than 150,000 lives, according to official accounts.

Malek emphasized, “There is, without a doubt, an orientation towards the top of the pyramid of power. Those with power do not want a fourth term for Bouteflika, but these people do not have the power to threaten the stronger side which wants him to remain in Al-Maradiya Palace (the presidential residence). It is evident that there is conflict, and several leaders such as (former prime minister) Ahmed Ouyahia have fallen. Even those besmirched with charges of corruption are considered part of President Bouteflika’s inner circle. The most realistic scenario, in my opinion, is that the supporters of a fourth term will succeed, despite the president’s deteriorating health. However, death or some other unforeseen event remains a possibility.”

For his part, Algerian political analyst Larbi Zouak mentioned that this is not the first time that President Bouteflika was flown abroad for treatment, but this is the first time that this was officially commented on by the prime minister.

He said, “This means that we are facing a situation similar to what happened in 2005, when he underwent surgery and remained hospitalized for several months.”

Zouak also stressed that the people of Algeria should take other considerations into account; the president’s poor health which has deteriorated since 2005; the turmoil spreading across the country which even the authorities have acknowledged; rampant corruption; and unrest in southern Algeria.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat: “The entire world has witnessed change recently, except for Algeria and North Korea. More ominous than all of this is that Bouteflika’s term is coming to an end, and everything hinges on the question on everyone’s mind: Will the president run for a fourth term?”

Zouak, known for his writings against the president’s policies, stated, “Those who know Bouteflika’s mindset claim that he is not prepared to step down as long as he is able to move, and that he will definitely run for office even if he is not able to leave his house or campaign. It is enough for him to give a speech on television. However, is Algeria so devoid of strength that it cannot stand up to a sickly man?”

“Bouteflika has certainly succeeded in transforming the political arena into an arid desert. He also shrunk the military establishment to the point that some Algerians have begun to wonder if they can depend on such a small number of troops if the situation in the country deteriorated. The truth is that there is huge difference between the military establishment of the 1990s and the military establishment today, and personally I doubt that this establishment can prevent Bouteflika from running…even if he were bedridden,” he added.

Zouak conceded, “In terms of alternatives to Bouteflika, personally I do not see anyone qualified to become president. If Bouteflika does run, his competitors would run to merely legitimize the electoral campaign, as happened in the last presidential elections. In Algeria, we are used to presidential election results being settled in advance for whomever the authorities choose. If Bouteflika does not run, then the authorities will naturally choose someone else. But if no developments take place and Bouteflika becomes incapacitated and unable to even appear on television, then personally I think Ahmed Ouyahia (former prime minister) or Ali Benflis (former prime minister) or Cherif Rahmani (current Minister of Industry) or to a lesser extent Ahmed Benbitour (former prime minister) could be chosen.I put Ahmed Benbitour at the tail end, seeing that he is the only one who is self-reliant.”

However Zouak stressed that “this can only happen in the event that Bouteflika’s becomes completely incapacitated. As for what happens if he is partially incapacitated, meaning he would not run but has some say in nominating the next candidate, I would wager on Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal; I can say for sure that he has both the army’s and Bouteflika’s approval.”

Rachid Tlemçani, Professor of Political Science at the University of Algiers, said, “The announcement of the president’s illness represents an unusual break from protocol, the goal of which is to prepare public opinion for the succession of Bouteflika.”

He added, “Before his mini-stroke, the president was committed to running for a fourth term, to the point that his supporters were preparing nominate him at the final event of the Algerian Cup between MC Alger and USM Alger on Wednesday.”

However, after this most recent health scare, the facts have changed. In the event that the president completes his third term but is not nominated for a fourth, Tlemçani explained that Algeria could enter a period of democratic transition and that the political arena would be open for the first time in Algeria’s history. Moreover, he said that the Black Bureau (enforcers of Algeria’s political decision makers) will no longer be able to select the regime candidate or fragment the army into different groups.

Ahmed Azimi, a former military officer and political analyst, stated that Bouteflika could call for early presidential elections as his predecessor Liamine Zéroual did in 1998. Azimi emphasized that the president’s age and his health concerns would most likely not allow him to seek a fourth term in office in 2014, saying, “If he chooses to stay until the end of his term, he will want to have some say in the selection of his successor, but I think that Algerian officials are not prepared to hold transparent presidential elections. Nothing is certain.”

Turkish university students, who were protesting the explosions that killed tens of people in Reyhanlı, near the border with Syria, last week, clashed with riot police at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey, Wednesday, May 15, 2013.(AP Photo)

The car bombs that exploded in Reyhanlı on Saturday have galvanized the existing schisms in southeastern Turkish society: between the supporters and the detractors of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, between those who back the revolution in neighboring Syria and those who oppose it, and between the myriad sectarian groups that make up this historically multicultural region.

“Erdoğan is following the wrong policy on Syria, and we want him out of power,” said an Antakya local who joined Monday’s demonstration, adding, “the United States is using Turkey to create problems in Syria. We never had problems with Syria before, only when Erdoğan became president.”

American imperialism and criticism of Erdoğan’s relationship with the United States and Europe are common themes at these protests.

A young teacher who joined Saturday’s impromptu demonstration just a few hours after news of the bombing broke said he thought that Erdoğan would use the attack as a pretext to send Turkish troops into Syria: “They will say that Bashar Al-Assad did this and that we have to fight back, but this war was started by the United States and Europe in their own imperial interests.”

But for the Syrian refugees who have settled in this region over the past eighteen months, the protests have a darker and more worrying tone.

One protester said: “We call the Syrians in Turkey the ‘illegal ones.’ They are coming here because they know that Erdoğan will give them money and they will have a better quality of life than they can ever have in Syria.”

The region’s geographical position and Erdoğan’s support for the Syrian opposition are the pull factors that have drawn thousands of refugees to the towns of Hatay province. The people who have settled in the local communities, as opposed to the refugee camps, are—for the most part—middle-class and well-educated. They have taken jobs as translators and humanitarian workers, rented apartments, and started new, albeit unplanned, lives in Turkey.

“Of all the neighboring countries, Turkey has been the best to the Syrians,” says Abdullah, an NGO coordinator who came here from Latakia a year ago. “Here, we can work and live our lives without worrying whether the government will send us back to Syria.”

Hatay is a region with a large native Alawite population that predominately supports the Syrian regime and Bashar Al-Assad. The arrival of the refugees, most of whom are Sunni and supporters of the opposition, has caused latent tensions, but the bombings in Reyhanlı have brought the undercurrents bubbling up to the surface.

“The bombings happened here because the local population is mostly Alawite,” said one protester. “Most of the people here support Assad, and this is the work of the Syrian opposition.”

While the Turkish government has blamed the bombings on the Syrian regime, many locals in Hatay disagree and believe that it is the work of extremists linked to the opposition. The rumors about how and why the attacks happened are rampant.

“This all started because a Syrian ate in a restaurant in Reyhanlı and did not pay the bill,” says one man. “The locals beat him up, and the bombs were planted in revenge.”

Other protesters say that 146 were killed in the attack, not the 46 reported by the media, that only Turks were killed, or that the Syrians in Reyhanlı had prior warning and closed their shops and restaurants before the bombs were detonated. In the heated atmosphere of Hatay a whisper can spread like wildfire, and many angry locals are thirsty for revenge.

“If the government does not kick the terrorists, out then we will kick them out ourselves,” says one angry protester. Another explains how he can spot the Syrian extremists in Antakya “by the way they walk and their beards.”

For Hatay’s Sunni Syrian population, the threat of reprisal feels real and imminent. In Reyhanlı, there were reports of Syrian cars being attacked in the hours after the bombs exploded, and in Antakya a pistol was fired through the window of a Syrian shawarma restaurant. At the Syrian falafel shop opposite, the workers were phlegmatic: “We’re used to shells and bombs, so this is nothing,” said one, a student who has been in Turkey for two months. However, NGOs including Save the Children told their Syrian staff to stay at home on Monday, and many other Syrians in the town are reluctant to leave their houses.

For Erdoğan, much hangs on how he chooses to react to the bombings; they have inflamed divisions in domestic politics as much as they have raised cross border tensions. But in Hatay province, the damage to relations between the Syrian refugees and their Turkish hosts is done, and will take a long time to repair.

“We are expecting more bombings in the towns and villages around here,” said a protester at the end of a third day of demonstrations. “There are more problems to come.”

This Tuesday, April 30, 2013 photo shows a large poster of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, center, and two Alawite fighters killed in Syria. The Arabic writing that reads, “At your service, oh Assad,” and, “Bullets will not terrify us and we are not scared of traitors.” (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)

Swimming against the great tide of people who have defected from the Syrian regime, Mahmoud describes himself as a defector from the opposition. “I know about a hundred people who think like me,” he says, “but this is a town of two thousand people.”

Sitting in a restaurant in the heart of rebel-held territory, he talks freely about how he fears the shape that the revolution is taking and about his sympathies for the widely despised president, Bashar Al-Assad. He insists that he could not speak so openly if it wasn’t for his friend—a media officer with a powerful local brigade—sitting next to him. “A lot of my friends are working with the Free Syrian Army,” he says, “and if I am with them then no-one will hurt me. But if it were just me and you sitting here, I wouldn’t be able to speak with you like this.”

Mahmoud explains how, in the increasingly confusing spectrum of the opposition, a new and troubling group has emerged. He calls them the Shabiha Al-Thuwra—the Thugs of the Revolution—a name that evokes Assad’s gangs; according to Mahmoud they even use the same tactics as Assad’s ultra-loyalist paramilitary thugs. “Everyone is working for himself now,” he says. “The Free Syrian Army is becoming the same as the regime. They do exactly the same things.”

He describes how retribution works on either side of the divide. Mahmoud’s brother, an opposition supporter, was arrested by the regime. A few months later one of his friends, a general in the regime’s Shabiha, fell victim to the same fate at the hands of the Free Syrian Army. “My brother was held for fifty days when he was arrested by the regime,” Mahmoud says, “but my family used all their connections and paid 400,000 Syrian lira to get him released.” Bribery was not an option for his friend. “The Free Syrian Army killed him. Some Shabiha deserve that because they have killed innocent people, but for him they had no evidence.” He explains why he prefers the methods of the Assad government in terms of pure pragmatism: when dealing with the regime, it is at least possible to buy your life back.

Mahmoud’s views, like those of his friends, are reinforced by the news he watches. The citizens of this increasingly splintered country now choose their media sources according to their loyalties.

In rebel bases and homes in the opposition-held areas, a plethora of low-budget revolutionary TV channels blare out sensationalist reports of the latest victories against government troops. In the regime areas, state television keeps support for the government army buoyant through fear-based propaganda about acts of Islamist terror in opposition areas.

As we watch reports of Israel’s bombing of Damascus on Al-Jazeera Arabic, Mahmoud says that he no longer watches that channel either: “I think they are serving their own interests by supporting the revolution. I’ll watch the BBC and France 24, and Syria TV too, but not Al-Jazeera or the opposition channels.”

He questions too the tactics of the Free Syrian Army in the area he lives in. “This town was taken by the rebels months ago, so why are they not advancing forward?” he asks. “Why do they keep their bases in the civilian areas here?” His house was shelled by the regime several months ago, and he believes that the attack was prompted by the dushka anti-aircraft gun—owned by a member of the Free Syrian Army—placed on full view outside the house next door.

There are some things on which everyone at the table agrees. Challenged by his opposition-supporting friends, Mahmoud concurs that the Assad regime was bankrupt: “They stole from the people, and that’s why I went to the protests at the start.”

He shares none of their personal hatred for Bashar Al-Assad himself: “I don’t believe he knows what the regime is doing,” he says. As his friends scoff in disbelief, he illustrates his point: “Say I own a factory, and people work for me. When I’m not in the building, I don’t know what they’re doing. I think that people on the inside are betraying Assad.”

His theory about the bombing in Damascus that killed four members of the president’s inner circle last July provokes derision from his friends. “I believe it was the CIA, and I have seen proof on the Internet,” he says. But his is just one of a wave of conspiracy theories that abound on both sides of the conflict, born of the dearth of reliable information about anything that happens in this increasingly opaque war.

Asked what he thinks the future of Syria will be, Mahmoud offers up an analysis as pragmatic as his views about the Shabiha: “No-one is winning now, so I think Syria will be split into two states, and the opposition and the government will make a deal with each other.”

Once again, his friends disagree with him—but they can agree to disagree and remain friends. Their situation is something that is becoming unusual in Syria: a country where friendships are being replaced by loyalties and once-idealistic supporters of the revolution are growing ever more disillusioned.

File photo of Egyptian Islamist Yasser Al-Sirri. (AAA)

The Riyadh Compound Bombings saw coordinated suicide attacks targeting the Al-Hamra Oasis Village, the Vinelli Corporation Compound and the Dorrat Al-Jadawel compound on May 12, 2003, killing 34 and wounding 149. This infamous attack represented the beginning—and the beginning of the end—of Al-Qaeda operations on Saudi soil. In just a few short years, Saudi Arabia had clamped down on Al-Qaeda and its elements in the kingdom, forcing them to relocate south of the border.

Speaking exclusively to Asharq Al-Awsat on the tenth anniversary of the attack, Egyptian Islamist Yasser Al-Sirri revealed some of the background and consequences of the Riyadh Compound Bombings.

Sirri, who heads up the London-based Islamic Observatory Center—an organization concerned with the human rights of Islamist fundamentalists worldwide—revealed: “Prior to the attacks, the US had issued warnings about an impending terrorist attack targeting US citizens in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”

Following this, Saudi Arabia released a number of most wanted lists. The first such list included 19 of the most wanted terrorists, which was issued on May 7, 2003—just five days before the Riyadh attacks. It included a number of senior Al-Qaeda members, such as the first leader of Saudi Arabia’s Al-Qaeda branch, Khalid Hajj, as well as Riyadh cell leaders Abdulaziz Al-Muqrin and Turki Al-Dandani, and a number of individuals known to have been involved in the compound bombings.

Sirri, who is also known as Abu Ammar Al-Masri, acknowledged that there were huge divisions within Al-Qaeda at this time, particularly over operational issues and leadership.

Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden had appointed Khalid Hajj as head of the Saudi branch of the organization, while Muqrin and Dandani were leaders of separate Al-Qaeda cells based in Riyadh. This is something that led to disputes between Dandani and Muqrin over future plans, particularly after the Saudi Al-Qaeda leadership received a message from Bin Laden ordering the beginning of a domestic terrorist campaign.

Dandani wanted to begin attacks at once, fulfilling Bin Laden’s stated objective of inciting chaos across the kingdom, while Muqrin wanted to postpone operations until preparations could be completed.

Sirri revealed: “The dispute between Muqrin and Dandani was brought to the attention of Al-Qaeda emir Khalid Al-Hajj, who inclined towards Dandani’s view. He gave the cell a deadline to finish preparations, although the security forces were closing in. This led to Hajj issuing the final orders for the Dandani cell to start the attacks, which culminated in the three suicide bombings in eastern Riyadh.”

One striking piece of evidence is a letter seized by security forces from senior Al-Qaeda member Youssef Al-Uyari. Addressed to Al-Qaeda’s security chief Saif Al-Adel, it asked permission for the cell to postpone the operations until further preparation could be made, while it is widely believed that Saif Al-Adel and Saad bin Laden were responsible for ordering this attack.

This message is important because Saif Al-Adel, along with a number of other senior Al-Qaeda members, were being held in Tehran under house arrest during this time, after fleeing Afghanistan following the 2001 US invasion.

Saif Al-Adel is believed to have masterminded the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Dar es Salasm and Nairobi, resulting in hundreds of deaths. According to the FBI’s most wanted terrorist list, Saif Al-Adel is wanted by the US for “conspiracy to kill United States nationals, to murder, to destroy buildings and property of the United States, and to destroy the National Defense utilities of the United States.”

Saif Al-Adel joined Al-Qaeda in the 1980s; he is a former Egyptian intelligence officer and is known to have provided Al-Qaeda members with military and counter-intelligence training. Following Bin Laden’s death in 2011, he was widely considered to be a contender for leadership of the terrorist organization; however, deputy leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri was later announced as the new emir.

As for the consequences of the Riyadh Compound Bombings, Sirri told Asharq Al-Awsat: “By attacking innocent civilians, Al-Qaeda critically wounded itself.”

He clarified, “Any organization loses a lot by targeting innocent civilians, so we must not take the shedding of blood lightly.”

Sirri also revealed that “Muqrin, who was killed in an ambush in Riyadh’s Al-Malaz district in 2004, had previously fought in Algeria, Bosnia and the Horn of Africa. He had been captured in Ethiopia in the late 1990s, when he was fighting in Somalia. The Ethiopian authorities handed him over to Saudi Arabia, and he was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment.”

However, Saudi authorities released Muqrin from prison just two years later, cutting his sentence in half as a reward for memorizing the Qu’ran. Muqrin was known as being intelligent, charismatic and a master tactician; he was also a skilled propagandist who used the Internet to recruit followers.

Sirri told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Riyadh Compound Bombings were the beginning of events that lasted for several years, and over the past ten years 120 have been killed and 1,050 injured in the domestic war on terrorism.

Sirri is an Egyptian Islamist who was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment and execution during the Mubarak era as part of the so-called Returnees from Albania case. Sirri was convicted of taking part in an attempted assassination of former Egyptian interior minister Atef Sadki.

Saudi Arabian special security forces march during a military parade at a base near Mount Arafat, southeast of the holy city of Mecca. (AFP)

Stanford, Asharq Al-Awsat—Ten years ago yesterday, the Saudi capital, Riyadh, was rocked by three near-simultaneous suicide bombings at housing compounds for expatriates. Over 30 people died and 160 were injured in what was, and remains, the deadliest terrorist attack in the kingdom’s history. The bombing came as a shock to most Saudis and robbed the country of its relative innocence as far as internal violence was concerned. After decades of calm, Saudi Arabia suddenly became the scene of a dramatic and protracted terrorist campaign that would claim many victims and worry many an oil investor before Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was finally crushed in 2006.

It is hard to overestimate the political impact of the Riyadh bombings. These caused a major shift in Saudi attitudes toward Islamist extremism and a complete overhaul of the Saudi internal security apparatus. The terrorism campaign—and the Saudi response to it—also did much to change Western perceptions of Saudi society, many of which, in retrospect, were biased and flawed. Finally, the campaign backfired against Al-Qaeda, leading to its demise as an organization in the kingdom. In short, the learning curve was steep for everyone involved. Specifically, the experience taught us ten important things about terrorism and Saudi Arabia.

First, we learned that terrorist campaigns need not have deep, structural causes. In the summer of 2003, many observers attributed the violence to a fundamental malaise in Saudi society, derived from some combination of economic sclerosis, lack of political participation, and religious indoctrination. However, as I showed in my book, Jihad in Saudi Arabia, the causes were mostly exogenous: the terrorists had radicalized and trained abroad, and the timing was dictated by events in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Like many terrorist campaigns, this one was the result of developments within an organization.

The second lesson is that wars affect international terrorism in unpredictable ways. Nobody I know had considered that the fall of Kabul might produce terrorism in Riyadh. In retrospect, we can see that it made strategic sense for Al-Qaeda to send its army of Saudi trainees back to the kingdom, given that the alternative was near-certain death or capture in Afghanistan. Conversely, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 had the unexpected—but exact opposite—effect of undermining the Al-Qaeda campaign in Saudi Arabia, by creating a battlefront that for Saudi Islamists was theologically less controversial—and thus more worthy of material support—than the home front.

Third, war volunteers often become terrorists even though they started with less malign intentions. Most of the Saudis in Afghanistan in 2001 had not intended to join Al-Qaeda, but to train so they could fight in Chechnya or other war zones. They had left as foreign fighters, motivated by a desire to help Muslims at war abroad. Once in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda indoctrinated them into Bin Laden’s global jihad project. Prior to 2003, many Saudis saw fighting abroad as a relatively harmless activity distinct from terrorism. However, the perpetrators of the Riyadh Compound Bombing were nearly all former foreign fighters; they were the proverbial chickens coming home to roost.

Fourth, not all jihadists endorse Bin Laden’s global terrorism strategy. In fact, most radical Islamists in Saudi Arabia were what I call “classical jihadists,” who approved of fighting in war zones such as Chechnya, but not in uncontested areas like Saudi Arabia. Prior to 2003, many Western observers mistook classical jihadism for global jihadism and overestimated Al-Qaeda’s support base in the kingdom. The relative support for each of the two positions became very clear when young Saudi militants flocked to Iraq after 2003, leaving AQAP desperate for recruits.

Fifth, radical Islamism is not an existential threat to the Saudi state. In 2003, some Western observers thought the Al Saud kingdom might not make it, and many expected the violence to escalate into a veritable insurgency. We now know that Al-Qaeda never stood a chance, because it had no popular support and because the group’s core was a closed network of Afghanistan veterans that was easy to rein in once identified.

The sixth lesson is that terrorists often make grave strategic miscalculations. Al-Qaeda’s decision to launch a campaign in Saudi Arabia was disastrous, because it destroyed the group’s entire infrastructure in the kingdom, including logistics networks that might have remained useful for much longer. Osama bin Laden, like Western observers, overestimated Saudi popular support for Al-Qaeda. Like many terrorists, he had lost touch with his original constituency, and he fell for the temptation to act when waiting would have been better. As Abdulrahman Al-Rashed famously predicted in this very newspaper ten years ago, “By targeting New York on September 11, the extremists have shot themselves in the foot. In the Riyadh bombings the same extremists shot themselves in the head.”

Seventh, Saudi Al-Qaeda members were much like terrorists everywhere else. They were young males from urban backgrounds who had joined through social networks, often in search of camaraderie and adventure. There is little evidence of a “tribal factor” or “southern radicalism” in their profiles. To the extent that ideology motivated them, it was ideology in a very rudimentary sense, not some elaborate theological code. Most common was the belief that Muslims were being exterminated by non-Muslims. Only a handful of members had a very strong interest in the finer points of their ideology.

Eighth, technology can help terrorists, but it usually favors governments in the long run. In the early part of the campaign, militants exploited the Internet, mobile phones and digital cameras to their considerable tactical advantage. However, authorities soon caught up with the militants and developed a tracking and surveillance capability that severely restricted Al-Qaeda’s ability to communicate or move around.

Ninth, counter-terrorism works best when it is targeted and calibrated. The Saudi response to the Riyadh Compound bombings was relatively successful because it was restrained. History is full of governments that responded to terrorism by lashing out against an invisible enemy, thereby creating new grievances that only served to aggravate the problem. Unlike Algeria and Egypt in the 1990s, Saudi Arabia did not conduct mass arrests and appears to have abstained from systematic torture. It also developed a prisoner rehabilitation program that, despite some cases of recidivism, is better than most alternatives. However, not everything is rosy: like the United States, Saudi Arabia has a detainee problem in the form of individuals that the government, for various reasons, does not want to put on trial, but who are considered too dangerous to release.

Last but not least, it’s not over. A sustained terrorism campaign in Saudi Arabia is unlikely any time soon, but the threat from ad hoc attacks will persist for at least another decade. The Yemeni incarnation of AQAP is thriving and wants to take its war to Saudi Arabia. The Al-Qaeda movement has a long memory, and the legacy of the Riyadh attackers is preserved in Internet propaganda and by people who knew them personally. Someone will want to finish what Bin Laden started ten years ago. We owe it to the victims of the Riyadh Compound bombings to stop that from happening.

This Friday, January 11, 2013 file citizen journalism image provided by Edlib News Network (ENN), which has been authenticated based on its contents and other AP reporting, shows rebels from Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat Al-Nusra as they sit on a truck full of ammunition in Idlib province, northern Syria. (AP Photo/Edlib News Network ENN, File)

But then Youssef walked into the room, and I knew it would all be okay. He had one of those faces: warm, always smiling, etched with teenage conviviality and impossible not to like. He liked me instantly, too, and that evening we downed sugary drinks until we became high and hysterical, and danced—badly—to Metallica as shellfire crumped in the distance. After I left Aleppo we kept in touch, and when I returned to the city two months later I wanted to see him first. And there he was, with the same gleaming smile and the same warm hug I remembered.

But something had changed in Youssef. As we drove across Aleppo to find somewhere to buy kebab, he told me that he’d applied to join the Al-Nusra Front, the foreign Islamist group that declared its allegiance to Al-Qaeda just a few weeks ago. “Al-Qaeda are good!” he told me, with a smile and a double thumbs up. “I hope that they’ll accept me and that one day I can set off a suicide bomb in a regime area.”

As we passed through the battered streets he told me his reasons. First was the monthly salary of 11,000 Syrian lira. It is a pitiful wage for a potential suicide bomber, but enough to tempt an eighteen-year-old stuck in a war zone with no job, no money and nowhere to study. His dream, he said, was to come to London. “I’d like to go abroad and make something of myself. But how can I do that without money and a passport? Maybe I can come to London and sleep on your floor. London is a great city.” I told him that suicide bombers had hit London eight years ago, and that they had killed scores of innocent people. Why would he want to do the same thing in Syria? “No, no, no!” Youssef waved his hands, distraught. “The bombers in London were not Al-Qaeda. And that’s not what I want to do. I’ll set off my bomb at a regime check-point. If I did it in a marketplace and killed normal people then everybody would start to hate Al-Qaeda and they would kick them out of Syria.”

I asked what his friends thought of his decision. He told me that his family lived in a Christian area of the city that remains in the hands of Bashar Al-Assad’s troops. When his uncle and grandfather were killed because of their support for the opposition, he and his parents fled to a rebel-held area of the city. But his friends and the rest of his family stayed in his old neighborhood, and they continued to support the government. “I still speak to them sometimes,” he said. “Most of their parents work for the regime, so they support the regime too. I told one friend that I could help his father defect, because I don’t want to have to kill him someday. But he said no. When I kill them, it will be revenge for what happened to my uncle and grandfather.”

Next, Youssef told me he’d lost faith with the more secular opposition brigades. “Most of them are criminals,” he said. “But Jabhat Al-Nusra are fighting effectively. They’ve fixed a lot of things in Aleppo, and I’m a hundred percent certain that they can make things better here.”

As I looked at him in his Gucci polo shirt, jeans and modish haircut, I found it difficult to imagine him in the get up of an Islamic extremist. “Will you have to grow a beard?” I asked. “You know, I’m pretty sure they won’t accept me,” he replied. “I’m too liberal. But maybe they’ll think I’ll be useful to them, because I can still go into regime areas so I could transport weapons there for them.”

He described an application process that would not seem out of place at a corporate multinational. He had put his name down on a list through a Lebanese friend, to wait his turn for an interview with one of the Al-Nusra Front’s top men. In the mean time, the group had scrutinized his Facebook page. “They don’t accept just anyone,” he told me. “You have to be serious about religion.” A photo of the two of us together in Aleppo had apparently given them cause for concern. “Because of that, they told me that I’m not ready yet,” he said. “I have to forget about the past, and stop mixing with women.”

After we had eaten, we said our goodbyes. We hugged and kissed each other on both cheeks, and I wondered if we would do that the next time we met. I hope that I will meet him again. I hope that Jabhat Al-Nusra will reject his application, although I fear that his eagerness, youth and thirst for revenge make him exactly the kind of recruit they are looking for. And more than anything, I hope that this war will soon be over, so that Aleppo can come back to life and the people can be optimistic about the future once again. Until that happens, Jabhat Al-Nusra will have no problems recruiting their foot-soldiers. They will carry on feeding on people like Youssef—ordinary boys who feel that they have nowhere else to go.

Black and white file photo of Al-Qaeda in Iraq commander Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. (AP)

The case of Wafa Al-Yahya came to the spotlight after a video clip showing a gathering of men and women somewhere in Jeddah chanting demands was posted on YouTube. Following this, a number of websites, including social media, began to focus on Wafa’s story, positing it as a human tragedy.

There have been a number of claims and counter-claims swirling around Wafa’s story. We have heard claims that she was arrested in 2005 and remains in prison, unable to receive visitors or make telephone calls; that she was arrested along with her three children—two girls and a boy—and they remain imprisoned alongside her; that her husband—an army officer—completely denies her existence, along with that of his children; that she is on the run; or that she has been killed.

Following a prolonged investigation into the case, Asharq Al-Awsat can now exclusively reveal Wafa’s true story. Asharq Al-Awsat spoke with a number of informed sources who, speaking on condition of anonymity, confirmed a great deal of background information about her.

Wafa was born in 1968; she holds a bachelor’s degree in Islamic studies, a master’s degree in Islamic Jurisprudence and has previously worked as a lecturer at Riyadh’s King Saud University. She is divorced and a mother of three: two girls and a boy.

Wafa reportedly showed an early interest in the conflict in Afghanistan, something that she did not keep from her immediate family, who knew of her support for the mujahedeen. By the end of 2005, Wafa had begun to spend a significant amount of time online, visiting Islamic extremist and jihadist websites. This soon escalated to the point that Wafa became a well-known presence on a number of jihadist websites, utilizing avatars such as “Al-Mudawia” (The Caller), “Al-Bariqa” (Ray of light), and “Bariqat Al-Seyoof” (Glimmer of Swords).

Wafa mainly wrote about changing attitudes towards the mujahedeen, expressing her support for the fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan and even praising Al-Qaeda’s activities and operations in Saudi Arabia.

It was on one of these websites that Wafa came into contact with a person calling himself “Abu Talha Al-Bihani.” In a message to Wafa, he called on her to join the jihad in Iraq, inviting her to join a Shari’a committee, given her academic qualifications. Wafa asked for some time to think.

Wafa Makes Her Choice

Wafa eventually agreed to join the fighters in Iraq and started planning her journey. She took a leave of absence from her work at the university and applied for passports for herself and her children. In the meantime, she remained in touch with Bihani, who informed her via email that he might be killed and that he hoped this would not cause her to change her mind about travelling to Iraq. He also told her that should this happen, she would be contacted by somebody calling himself “Al-Ustaz” (The Master), who would take care of all her travel arrangements.

Following this, infamous Al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, issued a recording announcing the deaths of a number of jihadists, including Bihani. This led her to conclude that Abu Talha Al-Bihani was very close to the jihadi leadership in Iraq.

Wafa was then contacted by Al-Ustaz. Experts believe that Al-Ustaz was none other than Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi himself. Zarqawi is widely regarded as having been one of Al-Qaeda’s most violent and visible leaders, being responsible for a series of high-profile bombings and hostage-takings during the Iraq war. He was killed in an US air strike on June 7, 2006, in a house north of Baghdad.

Travel Arrangements

After arranging to travel to Iraq via Syria, Wafa Al-Yahya realized that she was facing a major problem—namely, that her children’s passports were in the possession of her ex-husband, who refused to hand them over to her. Attempting to resolve this issue, she convinced one of her relatives to apply for alternate passports for her children, providing all the required documentation.

However, Wafa’s actions had not gone unnoticed by the government, and she was placed under surveillance by the Saudi security services.

According to information obtained by Asharq Al-Awsat, Wafa’s name was also placed on the travel ban list during this time as a precaution.

Of course, Wafa did not know this and she continued to make plans to travel to Iraq to join the jihad, booking flights to Syria. Wafa had initially booked tickets for the entire family, but she later cancelled her children’s bookings out of fear of being exposed. She confirmed her own flight to Syria, claiming that she was travelling to carry out research in the country. However, on her arrival at Jeddah’s King Abdulaziz International Airport, the authorities detained her and prevented her from boarding her plane.

On March 9, 2005, Wafa was summoned and detained by security forces for illegally communicating with Al-Qaeda elements in Iraq. On April 14, 2005, the police handed Wafa over to her family—her father and two brothers—after receiving the required “pledges” of fidelity and loyalty.

Sources confirm that the police only released Wafa Al-Yahya out of “respect for her family and because the [Saudi] leadership is always keen to dismiss cases against women.”

Disappearance

After only a short period in the care of her relatives, Wafa began to communicate once more with Al-Qaeda elements over the Internet. During this period, she received an e-mail from Al-Ustaz, who Asharq Al-Awsat has uncovered as being none other than Zarqawi himself. This message warned her against communication via the Internet and called on her to travel as soon as possible. Wafa replied that she was ready to travel, albeit without specifying a date.

A short while later, she received a message which included detailed travel plans. The plans were for Wafa to travel to Damascus, where she would then meet a contact at the Al-Assad Library. These plans were later changed, and she was provided contact information for two mobile phones in Damascus, along with a code-word. She was to tell whomever answered that she had arrived to complete her studies and not disclose her real reason for travelling. Following this, she would be provided a guide to escort her into Iraq.

On August 1, 2005—coinciding with the day of the death of King Fahd bin Abdulaziz—Wafa disappeared, along with her children, from their home. At this point, Wafa’s daughters were aged 13 and 5, while her son was aged 12. An extensive search was conducted for the family, but the security services were unable to locate them owing to a lack of credible intelligence.

Sources informed Asharq Al-Awsat of the difficulties faced by this investigation, as efforts to locate Wafa and her children proved fruitless. However, the case finally caught a break on September 6, after Yemen informed its northern neighbor that a number of Saudi nationals had been arrested in the country. Further investigation revealed that one of these suspects had smuggled a Saudi woman and her three children into Yemen. Saudi Arabia and Yemen coordinated their investigations, and the suspect confessed to smuggling Wafa Al-Yahya and her children across the border.

The informed source revealed that this breakthrough occurred while then Saudi Crown Prince and Defense Minister Prince Sultan Bin Abdulaziz was paying an official visit to Yemen. The source told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Saudi crown prince raised the issue with his Yemeni counterpart, leading to a Saudi Defense Ministry officer being assigned to travel to Yemen to question the Yemeni suspect: Rashed.*

Saudi Arabia pressured Sana’a to deport the Saudi nationals who had been arrested in Yemen in the hopes of continuing the investigation with them. Finally, on April 30, 2006, the Saudi suspects were handed over to Saudi authorities. They were questioned and it was revealed that one of the suspects, SN** had been involved in the operation to smuggle Wafa Al-Yahya and her children across the border, along with Yemeni national Rashed.

According to information revealed by SN and Rashed in 2005, SN had received a call on his cell phone from SY,*** a Saudi national based in Syria. SY informed SN that one of his associates would be contacting him in the near future for help—something that SN agreed to provide.

A short while later, this associate, Rashed, contacted SN, introducing himself as an envoy for SY. Rashed and SY arranged to meet in Riyadh’s Al-Mursalat district, whereupon Rashed informed SY that he wanted him to help smuggle the family of one of the mujahedeen—comprising a wife and three children—into Syria.

Rashed asked SN for assistance in obtaining Saudi passports for the family. He also handed over a message from SY, which included propaganda inciting youth to commit jihad, as well as the cell phone numbers of two facilitators. These two facilitators included an unnamed Saudi national and a Yemeni national known as “Abu Al-Bara.”

For his part, SN contacted Abu Al-Bara on the orders of SY, arranging a meeting close to Riyadh’s Obeikan bookshop. During this meeting, Al-Bara informed SN that he could obtain falsified Yemeni documents via a Yemeni contact known as “Louay.”

The sources informed Asharq Al-Awsat that during this period, this cross-border criminal network revealed above was heavily involved in sending prospective jihadists to Iraq. This would be achieved by first smuggling them into Yemen, where they would then be provided with forged passports to travel to Syria, usually via a Gulf state. From here, they could then cross the border into neighboring Iraq.

Returning to Wafa Al-Yahya and her children, SN—who coordinated this operation on the ground—attempted to contact SY, to brief him of the latest developments, but received no response. This prompted SN to contact a second figure, a Syrian national known as Mazen Tabin, who also played a role in smuggling Wafa and her three children into Syria. Subsequently, SN visited Mecca to perform umrah (pilgrimage), whereupon he called Rashed and informed him that he would not be able to obtain false passports for Wafa and her children.

After some discussion, both men agreed that SN would accompany Wafa and her children to the Al-Jizan region bordering Yemen. SN returned to Riyadh and purchased tickets, then contacted Rashed and informed him of the date of the booking. Rashed then got back to SN, telling him that Wafa and her children would be waiting for him at King Khalid International Airport.

SN met up with Wafa Al-Yahya as arranged and accompanied her and her children from Riyadh to Jizan, the southernmost region of Saudi Arabia, exploiting the fact that—at that time—he was not known to the authorities.

Following this, SN rented a car and smuggled Wafa and her children across the border into Yemen. At this point, SN and Rashed split up; the Yemeni entering the country via the Al-Tawal border checkpoint, while the Saudi returned to the Jizan airport, returning the hired car and then entering Yemen officially.

After SN landed in Sana’a, Rashed called to inform him that the family had also reached the Yemeni capital safety. At this point, SN returned to Saudi Arabia. Although Rashed was arrested in Yemen not much later, the deal that SN had previously made with Syrian national Mazen Tabin—for forged passports for Wafa and her children—came through. It was later revealed that they had travelled to Damascus from Sana’a. As for SN, his accomplice, Rashed—at this point in the custody of the Yemeni authorities—contacted him and convinced him to come to Yemen, where the Yemeni authorities were waiting to arrest him. SN remained in Yemeni custody until he was later handed over to Saudi Arabia.

The information that SN provided to the authorities about Wafa, confirmed what Rashed had revealed to Saudi investigators who questioned the Yemeni national while he was in custody.

In addition to this, SN revealed that his uncle, Saleh, had hosted Wafa and her children, while Syrian authorities confirmed that Wafa had entered Syrian territory.

Searching for Wafa in Iraq

Wafa’s circuitous journey to Iraq happened in the midst of a fierce and complex war. This was a war in which Zarqawi was playing a leading role in inciting sectarian strife, thanks to his attacks targeting Iraq’s majority Shi’ite community.

There is scarce information about the presence of Wafa and her children in the country, and it all originates from detainees returning from Iraq.

One detainee, Fahd R, who returned from Iraq in 2008, revealed that a Saudi woman known as Umm Mohamed (the mother of Mohamed) had entered the country along with her three children. He acknowledged that she later married Zarqawi, adding that he had heard that her daughter had also married in Iraq, but did not know anything about the fate of her other two children.

Fahd R was a senior Al-Qaeda member who was responsible for the border region and facilitating the entry of fighters into the country.

Another detainee, Mohamed Z, who was repatriated from Iraq in 2011, confirmed that a Saudi woman had entered the country with her children in 2005. He acknowledged that she later married Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, adding that he heard that she had subsequently been killed.

Abdurrahman Y, who was handed over to Saudi Arabia from Syria on June 7, 2009, also said that he heard that Wafa had entered Iraq and married Zarqawi.

Wafa’s Children

On the morning of June 9, 2012, the Saudi authorities arrested one of the country’s most wanted figures, Saleh Abdullah Saleh Al-Qarawi, also known as Nijm. Qarawi, commander of the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Abdullah Azzam Brigade, was included on the Saudi Interior Ministry’s infamous list of 85 most-wanted terrorists.

Qarawi previously lived in Iran, and is known to have received intense training with explosives in Afghanistan. He was targeted by an unmanned US drone in Waziristan, along the Pakistani–Afghan border, losing his legs, one hand, and his left eye. He returned to Saudi Arabia from Pakistan on a special medical transport, where he was treated in the state security hospital.

Here, he was reunited with his family: his wife—who also happens to be the daughter of Egyptian Mohamed Al-Hakamiya, also known as Abu Sara Al-Masri, also an Al-Qaeda leader—his son, H, two daughters and another son, and an adopted daughter.

As for what this has to do with Wafa and Zarqawi, Saudi authorities suspect that H is not the son of Qarawi—despite his protestations—but rather the child Zarqawi. A subsequent DNA test revealed that H truly is not Qarawi’s offspring, and his true parentage was later confirmed in a third DNA test: H is the son of Zarqawi and Wafa. In July 2012, Qarawi met with Jordanian Sayel Fadel Nazzal Al-Khalayleh—brother of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi—about the fate of H, obtaining Khalayleh’s approval for H to remain with the Qarawi family.

Sources reveal that H was most likely born to Wafa after Zarqawi’s death on June 7, 2006. A well-informed source claimed that Wafa was later killed in Iraq’s Anbar province.

Following Zarqawi’s death in 2006, Qarawi sought to secure a safe route out of Iraq for H, taking him to the lawless Waziristan region where he tasked wanted Saudi national Mohamed T with his care.

This is where Asharq Al-Awsat uncovered a second surprise: H was not alone. Rather, he was accompanied by his half-sister, the daughter of Wafa and Mohamed T. The Saudi national Mohamed T was subsequently killed in Pakistan, and his daughter was later adopted by the Qarawi family—along with her half-brother, H.

As for Wafa’s remaining children—the youngest boy and girl who accompanied her on her journey to Iraq—sources informed Asharq Al-Awsat that they had been present in Syria until recently. Their location is now unknown, particularly due to the unrest that has struck the region.

Wafa’s family has been informed about these developments, particularly following the false claims surrounding her disappearance which have been repeated on social media. The Al-Khalayleh family—Zarqawi’s family—were also informed of this, and are petitioning to take H—son of Zarqawi and Wafa—to Jordan.

Ultimately, Wafa Al-Yahya’s story sums up the impact that Al-Qaeda and its poisonous ideology has had on Saudi society.

*Rashed: associate of SY.
**SN: Not his real initials; Asharq Al-Awsat has chosen to keep him anonymous as he is currently being prosecuted.
***SY: Not his real initials. Asharq Al-Awsat is also preserving his anonymity.

In this Sunday, May 27, 2012, file photo, former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, right, smiles, as he sits next to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in an inauguration ceremony of the parliament in Tehran, Iran. (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi, File)

While a few dozen of the lesser-known contenders seized the opportunity for a free photo-op by turning up to register at the Interior Ministry in Tehran, the most high-profile individuals thought to be seeking the post have so far stayed away.

In the meantime, every action and word uttered by veteran politician and former president Hashemi Rafsanjani has been scrutinized for indications that he intends to put his name forward.

After months of ambiguous and contradictory comments, Rafsanjani hinted that he may run in a recent meeting with a group of university students.

“I will apply if I find my candidacy helpful for the people and the country, but if my presence proves to be divisive and a cause for disunity, then I will not,” he was reported as saying by the Entekhab news website yesterday.

Former presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani and Muhammad Khatami registering as candidates would be a nightmare scenario for hardline conservatives, who are loyal only to Ayatollah Khamenei.

Kayhan, a conservative Tehran daily newspaper under the direct supervision of Khamenei, fiercely attacked both Rafsanjani and Khatami on Wednesday, accusing them of “playing in anti-revolutionary ground.”

On Tuesday, Hossein Shariatmadari, the supreme leader’s representative at Kayhan, described Khatami as a “traitor and spy to foreign intelligent services,” stating that he is “to be delisted by the Guardian Council if he decides to nominate.”

Hardliners are increasingly concerned about the popularity of Hashemi and Khatami among Iranians, and are determined to push them back by any means. Shariatmadari, however, predicted that Rafsanjani will be approved by the Guardian Council if he chooses to run, but warned him on Wednesday “not to run: he will lose the election, and that means he is finished in politics.”

At the end of his presidency in 1997, Rafsanjani vowed to guard the integrity of the electoral process in the last Friday prayer sermon before that year’s presidential election.

Back then, it was a common knowledge that the supreme leader tended towards Ali Akbar Nategh-Nuri, the then speaker of parliament. When Khatami’s landslide victory in the poll was announced, it was clear that Rafsanjani had stood by his promise.

Sixteen years on, he still stands at the crossroads with his old friend and rival, the supreme leader, with the power to shape Iranian politics. In his camp are Mohammad Khatami, Hassan Rouhani, and majority of ministers, MPs and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps veterans who served in the Iraq–Iran War and held official posts up to 2005, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took office.

Rafsanjani has been the symbol of Iran’s moderate conservatives for quite a while, and he is now an ally of moderate reformists, too. On the other side, Ayatollah Khamenei leads an new political faction called “principalists,” which is comprised of fundamentalists and hardline conservatives.

The falling out between Ahmadinejad’s side and the principalist camp has created a difficult dilemma for Khamenei, who has to fight on two fronts. On one hand, he has to deal with the painful economic and legitimacy crises of the Iranian state. On the other, he seeks to overcome a wide range of international and regional stalemates Iran is entangled with.

Rafsanjani is seen as an experienced and prudent figure; and he enjoys this reputation even as the country is suffering its worst political and economic crises after 8 years of rule by the Khamenei–Ahmadinejad alliance.

Young Iranian supporters of Rafsanjani attend a campaign rally meeting in Tehran in this June 2005 file photo. (EPA)

None of the candidates from among Iran’s hardliners have such credentials—and even worse, they lack popular appeal.

Reza Ali-Jani, a veteran Iranian political commentator based in Paris, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the “principalists cannot reach agreement since they are made of various groups with different—and even opposing—interests. “

“The unity principalists enjoyed prior to the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005 was also due to the need to deter and suppress Hashemi Rafsanjani, in favor of bolstering Khamenei,” he added.

But according to E’temad newspaper, Hojjat Al-Islam Morteza Agha Tehrani, a cleric close to both Ahmadinejad and Khamenei and also general secretary of the hardline conservative Islamic Revolution Resistance Front led by Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, said on May 8 that “if there was no jurisprudential leadership [velayat-e faqih] in Iran, then all politicians would tear each other apart.”

He added: “Some politicians may still support [Rafsanjani], but his implicit support of the 2009 mutiny proves his true political stance is not in line with what the supreme leader envisages.”

On Tuesday, Mohammad Khatami published a statement on his website expressing delight on learning that Rafsanjani will submit his application for candidacy. “Why should the supreme leader be opposed to Hashemi’s candidacy, when he had praised Hashemi as a unique and superior companion?” he asked.

Khatami and Rafsanjani are leading in the unofficial polls taken by some anonymous organizations inside Iran that have been leaked to media, with no subsequent denials.

Hojjat Al-Islam Asgarpur, the spokesman of the Expediency Council chaired by Rafsanjani, also said yesterday that “Hashemi might nominate himself in the 90th minute,” a reference to the last minute of a soccer match.

The deadline for registration is Saturday, May 11.

Sadegh Ziba Kalam, a lecturer at the University of Tehran and an outspoken political commentator, said in an interview with the Ilna news agency on Wednesday that “[Rafsanjani’s] entry into the election will unite all reformists behind him, including Khatami.”

“If this happens, it means the whole conservative faction will gear up to crush him,” he added.

The ambiguity around Rafsanjani’s candidacy is not the only controversial issue in the upcoming election. The fate of Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, a close associate of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, is also yet to be revealed.

Khamenei and his supporters are beset on both sides by their potential foes, Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad—two rivals who are closing in on the supreme leader’s ivory tower inch by inch, from different directions.

A Free Syrian Army fighter stands behind a pile of sandbags in Raqqa province, east Syria, on May 6, 2013. (REUTERS/Hamid Khatib)

Six meters back in the darkness, Mahmmad sits at his desk with a cigarette in one hand and a phone in the other. Behind him, the three-starred flag of the Syrian opposition is pinned next to a sticker that bears a warning to Assad’s thugs: “No Shabiha allowed.”

He chides me for coming to speak to him at the busiest time of his day. “You should have come in the morning,” he says. “Syrians stay in bed until 11, so my shop is empty until then.” Hospitable nonetheless, he clears space on a chair, orders coffees from the drinks seller opposite, and talks about his business as customers file steadily into his shop.

Antakya is a small town in southeastern Turkey that is best known as the birthplace of Christianity. It used to pull in a smattering of summertime tourists and pilgrims, but since the Free Syrian Army captured a stretch of the Syrian border just half an hour’s drive from the town, the holidaymakers have been joined by a wave of journalists, NGO workers and rebel fighters who use it as their base to dip in and out of the war-stricken country. The hotels and cafes are heaving, the newsstands are full of international papers, and entrepreneurs like Mahmmad have joined the gold rush.

“I used to be an olive farmer in a village near the border,” he says, “but eight months ago I decided to open this shop. I am a Sunni and I have relatives in Syria who are fighting the regime, so by doing this I feel that I am helping them.” His customers are the fighters from rebel brigades who come to Antakya to buy their combat fatigues and sniper scopes. As the Free Syrian Army began to professionalize and adopt their own distinctive uniforms, commanders came to Mahmmad to buy hundreds of sets of clothes at a time. At the back of the shop, a small section of wall is hung with necklaces and wristbands in red, black and green—the colors of the revolutionary flag. “They buy these for their girlfriends and children,” says Mahmmad, “but if someone puts in a big order, I’ll throw in a few for free.”

The success of Mahmmad’s business is a sign of how commerce in Syria has slowed almost to a complete halt, and normal life, squeezed out by the ferocity of the war, has taken a sidestep over to Turkey. Scores of Syrian factories have been destroyed, while others have been closed down and shifted across the border by owners fearful that the same will happen to them. Even the people who stoically keep their businesses going inside the country often bring their products into Turkey to sell. Mahmmad greets an old man who has brought him a batch of ammunition belts. “I can’t sell them in Syria because there are no big markets any more, and I can’t advertise what I’m selling,” he says. “It’s easier to bring them here.”

Mahmmad’s shop in Antakya, Turkey. (Asharq Al-Awsat Photo)

She spreads out a pattern for an ammunition jacket on the table as she explains how she came into her trade. “I’d always just been a housewife,” she says, “but I learned how to sew by reading magazines. When my children were small, I made their school uniforms. I always thought that their education was the most important thing.”

Um Omar’s magazines never taught her how to make balaclavas and ammunition vests, but she says it was easy to learn. “I took a hunting jacket and copied the pattern, and then added the extra pockets for the ammunition,” she says. Picking up one of the jackets, she shows how she sews padding into the shoulders to make them more comfortable. “These are really heavy when they are full of ammunition, so I sew this into them to stop them rubbing,” she explains. “And now that it’s summer, I’m making the trousers from a lighter material. I’m always thinking how I can make my clothes more comfortable for the soldiers.”

Um Omar’s son and nephew have both fought with the rebels, but she has never met any of the fighters who wear her clothes. “I see them sometimes on the television and wonder whether they are wearing what I have made,” she laughs. “I’m proud to be helping them, and I hope soon they will win this war. I would like all this to be over so that I can go back to Latakia with my family.”

Back in the shop, Mahmmad says that thanks to Um Omar he can now sell the cheapest rebel uniforms in Antakya. “The other shopkeepers are angry because the commanders know that I sell at the best prices,” he laughs. When the war ends, he will return to his olive trees and ordinary life. But for now, business is booming.

Demonstrators hold Kurdish flags and flags with portraits of the jailed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan during a gathering to celebrate Newroz in the southeastern Turkish city of Diyarbakir March 21, 2013. Source: REUTERS/Umit Bektas

On April 25, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) announced that it would withdraw its militants from Turkish soil after more than four decades of fighting against Ankara, including carrying out terror attacks inside Turkey.

The announcement follows recent news that Ankara has begun official peace talks with PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan aimed at ending the long conflict in Turkey’s southeast. A successful resolution would deliver peace to Turkey and bring the Syrian Kurds—some of whom have indirect ties to the PKK—closer to Ankara. This in turn would strengthen Ankara’s hand as it strives to unseat the neighboring Bashar Al-Assad regime. Alongside Turkey’s rapprochement with the Iraqi Kurds, the process could help Ankara build a “Kurdish axis” in the Middle East, or at least a friendly cordon. Yet rivalries with Iran could complicate any such plans.

The new peace talks are based on the premise that Öcalan continues to hold sway over the organization he founded and can therefore deliver a deal. After Turkish forces captured him in 1999, he was tried and sentenced to death, but the sentence was later changed to life imprisonment after Turkey abolished capital punishment in 2002 in order to qualify for EU accession. Öcalan has spent more than fourteen years in solitary confinement. Initial discussions have already made his imprisonment more bearable. For instance, Turkish media reports indicate he was recently given cable television.

Although Murat Karayilan became the PKK’s leader after Öcalan’s capture, the founder still holds sway over the group and is revered as a cult figure by the rank and file. Hence, many members would likely comply if he told them to lay down their weapons. For now, the PKK has pledged to withdraw its fighters, and Turkey will reciprocate with a broad amnesty for all but the top echelons. Ankara might also grant Öcalan house arrest; deputy prime minister Bulent Arınç came close to conceding as much during a June 2012 television interview.

There are potential stumbling blocks, however. Even if Öcalan delivers large parts of the PKK under a peace deal, the other leaders could form splinter groups in the midto long term, most likely with support from Iran. Just as radicals broke away from the Irish Republican Army (IRA) after a ceasefire was reached in the late 1990s, forming the “Real IRA” and continuing to fight the British government, a “Real PKK” could arise in response to the talks with Öcalan.

For Tehran, Turkey’s emerging rapprochement with the PKK raises acute questions. Ever since Ankara threw its lot behind the Syrian uprising in late 2011, Iran has encouraged the group to target Turkey. Indeed, a number of last year’s PKK attacks in southeastern Turkey are known to have originated from Iran; if the PKK disarms, Tehran will be deprived of this lever.

In light of these concerns, Iran will likely step up its support for die hard anti-Turkish PKK splinter factions with the hope that this will cause the talks to fail. On April 29, Turkish daily Milliyet columnist Aslı Aydıntaşbaş quoted PKK leader Murat Karayilan as saying that top Iranian intelligence officials had offered him heavy weapons in exchange for defecting on the peace process; an offer that the PKK field commander claims he refused.

Still, there are three key reasons which suggest that the talks will move forward.

The first is Turkey’s strategic perspective: Until recently, Ankara had seen the “Kurdish card” in the region as a threat to its core interests. This view is changing. In recent years, Turkey has built strong commercial and political ties with the Iraqi Kurds, and it stands to reason that Ankara will seek something similar with the Syrian Kurds. If the PKK in Syria ingratiates itself with Ankara, Turkey will return the favor. The Turkish Kurds are the last piece of the puzzle. Should the recently-announced peace talks between Ankara and the PKK succeed, Turkey may be able to turn the “Kurdish card” to its favor.

A Turkey-PKK entente would also make it easier for Ankara to reach a better understanding with the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the most powerful Syrian Kurdish grouping linked to the PKK. In fact, a deal with the PKK could open the door to cooperation with Syrian Kurds against Assad. There are signs that this is already happening; the PKK is pulling its militants out of Turkey and sending them into Syria, where the PYD is taking a more belligerent stance against the Assad regime. Such a turn was foreshadowed in March, when the PYD began to fight Assad in the Sheikh Massoud neighborhood of Aleppo.

As Syria crumbles into a weak and potentially divided state, Turkey’s rapprochement with the PKK could make it easier to stabilize areas along its frontier with Syria. In the best case scenario, a cordon of friendly Kurdish communities could emerge on Turkey’s long, porous borders with Syria, boasting some measure of local self-government.

Iraqi Kurdistan’s strategic perspective is a second driver for peace: For Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and its president, Massoud Barzani, a full-fledged Turkey-PKK accord would cement the strong bonds that have developed over the past few years between Turkey and the KRG. This would also advance the KRG agenda of helping Syria’s Kurds achieve greater freedom by working with Turkey against the Assad regime, instead of the other way around.

A third factor driving the peace talks is related to Turkish domestic politics. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hopes to become the country’s next president in the summer 2014 elections. In the most recent elections, Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won 49.5 percent of the vote.

Erdoğan needs to build further support, without eroding his power base, in order to be elected as Turkey’s next president.

Enter the PKK. After Turkey shifted its Syria policy in fall 2011 from quiet pressure on Assad to supporting the rebels, Turkey witnessed a spike in PKK attacks coming from Iran. In fall 2012, Tehran entered a ceasefire with the PKK, and the group’s Iranian branch, Party for Democratic Life in Kurdistan (PJAK). This allowed the groups to attack Turkey, and gave Iran a proxy to strike back against Ankara for its shift on Syria. The PKK launched a number of brazen attacks aimed at capturing towns in southeastern Turkey. As the PKK gained ground, Erdoğan’s popularity seemed in danger of eroding

According to Turkish media, many of these attacks were launched by PKK units who infiltrated from Iran.

Erdoğan’s response has been to enter peace talks with the PKK, stemming the violence, and eliminating a hurdle ahead of his presidential ambitions. This would also serve Turkey’s domestic stability and its interests in Syria and Iraq. If the talks succeed, Erdoğan’s presidential moment and Turkey’s Kurdish moment will have arrived. Only Tehran stands in the way.