Former prime minister Hamadi Jebali waves to reporters following the transfer of power ceremony to newly appointed Tunisian prime minister Ali Larayedh, unseen, in Tunis, Tunisia, on Thursday March 14, 2013. (AP Photo/Hassene Dridi)

At the same time, Tunisia is dealing with a resurgence of Salafist extremism that will require not only a clear position from the government, but also broader regional and international cooperation.

Former Tunisian prime minister Hamadi Jebali resigned his post in March over the political violence that resulted in the assassination of leftist politician Chokri Belaid and the growing influence of Islamist extremism in his country’s politics. However, he continues to be the head of the Ennadha party, and there is now speculation that his party is positioning him to be its candidate for the presidency in elections that have been nominally scheduled to take place before the end of this year.

Asharq Al-Awsat met with Jebali during his recent visit to Oxford, where he was seeking partners in a joint Tunisia–Union for the Mediterranean project to promote higher education.

The following interview has been edited for length:

Asharq Al-Awsat: The positions you have taken since you became prime minister have led many to claim that you are the Ennahda Party’s candidate for the presidency. There are even those who saw the issue of the technocratic government as theatrics.

Hamadi Jebali: Really, there is no basis for such claims. We did not address the issue of the presidency during Ennahda’s last Shura council. First of all, this is issue must be carefully considered from all angles. Second, I have not yet decided whether or not I will participate in these elections. I am thankful for all of those who put their trust in me and expressed their confidence and hopes for me. My goal is the service of my country. I certainly have no personal ambitions in regards to any position of power right now. When I left the government, I left with conviction. This is not a personal issue for me. I am not concerned with that position, or any other one for that matter. The issue here is that, wherever and however I can, I will serve Tunisia. It is not important if it is a political position or some other one. What is most important is that it is an opportunity to truly work for the sake of Tunisia. I feel that what I am doing by touring around the world is in the service of my country. These are the standards by which I will determine whether or not I run for office.

However, were that the case—or, should I say, were God to test me again with a position of power—I imagine it will be in service of my country and political harmony. There would be no conflict or clashing, not even between the government and the political parties. Tunisia has grown weary of this fragmentation and polarization. The next stage must be one in which we build the foundation of a democratic nation and pay attention to the pressing economic issues at hand, as well at the more recent security concerns. Addressing violence and the use of weapons requires accord and understanding at the ruling level among leaders and on a national level; addressing this is one of the country’s greatest challenges. This is what we are calling for in the future, for a period of at least 5 years.

We also call for a president for all Tunisians, removed from any political pressure or partisan control. This is what I envision for Tunisia and for the next president, whether it is [myself] or someone else. Clashes between the prime minister and the president, or even with the parliament, do not serve the interests of Tunisia. Tunisia needs to rise up and meet the coming challenges, be they social, security or economic, and there must be harmony between all the political actors.

Q: Was the handshake between Shaykh Rachid Al-Ghannoushi, the head of Ennahda, and Beji Caid Al-Sebsi, the leader of Tunisian Call, a new page in your party’s relationship with the Tunisian Call party? Did it come as part of the concept that in politics there are no permanent enemies or friends?

First, we hadn’t planned anything for this meeting, not even the seating arrangements. I thought it was totally natural that they invited the previous prime ministers—my predecessor, Beji Caid Al-Sebsi, and myself—and the political parties. They started with Mr. Rachid, perhaps because he is the leader of the biggest party, or because he was the closest person to me. He was followed by Kemal Morjane.

I would like to say something here. I hope we can elevate our level of thinking. Is it true that in a meeting between rivals, if I’ve differed with one of them, that I must not shake his hand or talk to him or joke with him? Are we still operating on such a primitive level in politics? These political interactions should be civilized. Even if I disagree with someone, I will still sit and talk with him. We need to get away from such childishness and juvenile politics and put the future of the country at the forefront. If the relationship between the Ennahda party and the Tunisian Call party was not on good terms then that is between their leadership. I hope that Tunisia will not be ruled by anything but harmony and consensus. I have a big goal. Tunisia will not be governed by clashes, especially during the next stage.

I was surprised when people considered the handshake between Al-Sebsi and Al-Ghannoushi a disaster in Tunisia. This is proof that we’re still very far from the mentality of the revolution. I think we must differentiate between personal relationships and respect and bipartisanship and principled political positions. I don’t see any problem in talking with Mr. Beji, or Kemal Morjane, or others. This doesn’t stop us from speaking frankly and disagreeing or agreeing. Meetings and open dialogues are always positive. To anyone who doubts the power of dialogue, I would say that we all are living in a changing world, and remind them that the Prophet Muhammad would address everyone, friends and enemies alike. And I don’t see any enemies now…. Whoever defines himself as an enemy is responsible for himself.

Q: Ennahda’s partners in the government continue to accuse it of misconduct. For that reason, we have seen fragmentation within these parties and resignations from their leadership to form independent parties. How does your party respond to these allegations, and will these internal schisms give the Ennahda party a better chance to win and to rule independently?

As part of the responsibilities of my previous position, I would attend the troika and maintain relationships with these parties. I think there is a sizeable portion of these political groups that recognized their ministers and recognized that the government was heading towards real democracy. There were deliberations and consultations, and decisions were made by majority vote. I respected all of the ministers and never considered their political affiliations, and I interacted with all of them in a respectful manner on every issue. Now, the issue here is the appointments. The appointments were made intentionally. They know that we’ve always put ability at the head of the criteria for appointment. They recognize that this was my biggest concern as I looked to the administration and the cabinet. Now, if they say there is misconduct, then they’re exaggerating. True, sometimes I look in circles that I know better, but it cannot be said that there was preplanning or scheming.

There are some who criticize others for working with the Ennahda party, whether in the Ettakatol party or the Mutamir party. They naturally have their own inclinations, which they were aware of when they joined Ettakatol.

Regarding the other part of the question, it is not in Ennahda’s interest or in the nation’s interest to weaken political parties. It is dangerous to have one center of power, to have only one particular party in the political arena. This is part of the fundamentals of democracy, to achieve a peaceful transition of power and keep any one party from taking over and becoming a dictatorship. Single party powers emerge from power vacuums and lead to tyranny. I want what is best for the country and I am certain that it is in the nation’s best interest to have a contest over power. Even in a match between a strong team and a weak team, nothing matters until game time. This is far more important than a game. This is the future of the country. There must be peace and harmony among the people, as they choose who will take power.

Q: Do you believe that a presidential government is best for Tunisia, or do you prefer the parliamentary system?

In theory, the parliamentary system is closer to democracy and popular representation; there is no doubt about that. But this requires considering and meeting necessary preconditions; otherwise, power will break down and be subject to the whims of even the smallest party in parliament. We have a number of examples before us, but they may not be applicable to this situation since they have entrenched institutions. Belgium, like Italy, could go without a government for months, but it has independent institutions in the state, the opposition, the judiciary, the administration and in the security branch. At this point, it would be very difficult to consider this the best model for Tunisian government. On the other hand, our problem has always been going to extremes, so the presidential system looms large over us. We are afraid that the constitution may not be respected, among many other possible violations. Even if a president won political legitimacy through elections and we determined his powers, given the fragility of state institutions and the lack of political traditions we are afraid that this president would take over and lean towards authoritarianism, if not despotism.

So those two systems are unlikely. It is possible that the solution for Tunisia would be system that combines elements of both, but if there were not certain conditions in place it could also be a huge impediment, since the president and the prime minister could come into conflict with one another.

Q: What kind of conditions?

Consensus and balance. If the transitional period lasted five to ten years, the president of the republic should work with the government with as much harmony and consensus as possible.

Q: What would guarantee that harmony?

That is what I just said. The parties in Tunisia must realize that the next stage must be a period of harmony. If I am nominated—and I still haven’t decided if I will run or not—it would be in keeping with that philosophy. I will not be a scapegoat for any party. The president must be for Tunisians, the refuge for all Tunisians. He must be conciliatory; [he must] bring parties together and not divide them. He must work with the government. This is the condition that must be met; otherwise, the political system will face another catastrophe in addition to the security, economic, and social challenges we will be facing.

Q: In Tunisia, there are calls for a law that would protect the revolution, especially from the Ennahda party. However, when Libya passed a political isolation law, Ennahda called the move ‘hasty.’ Isn’t this contradictory?

I won’t judge Libya. This issue concerns them. Politics should have morals and principles that govern them. However, there is no need to say that, in our religion and according to international judicial norms, crimes are individual acts. No one bears the burden of another soul…. This is true on the individual, personal level, but it also applies on the political level. It is true that the Tajamaa’ party [the ruling party under Ben Ali] corrupted the country and isolated the judiciary.

Now, we look at anyone joining that party and wonder whether they have committed a crime—but this should be determined by a fair and independent judiciary. Further, any person who as committed a crime, whoever he may be—even Ben Ali himself—has to stand before the court, defend himself and face judgment. The fundamentals of good and just governance say that there should be a judge, the accused, and the aggrieved party. The accused should have the right to defend himself, and the judge should be independent.

The isolation law at its base harms Ennahda and it will be seen as a politicized law designed to isolate political factions before the elections. I say that everyone who committed a crime should stand before the court, but there is a court called the Tunisian people and the elections. Elimination from the political scene happens through elections and the ballot box. If there is any other crime, then the judiciary should deal with it.

Q: Given the events at Mount Chambi and the conflicting reports around the seriousness and danger of Salafist jihadism in Tunisia, many believe that the government has been evasive and its positions are unclear. Can you comment?

I don’t see any need for such talk. Some groups think that the government bears responsibility for every event in Tunisia. Would it be in the government’s interests to hide such serious issues?

However, there are security issues that cannot be disclosed or discussed. This is a serious matter as it has brought Tunisia to a dangerous position—the use of weapons. There used to just be discourse, demonstrations and the like. This represents a tectonic shift in Tunisian political life and in Tunisian society. After these dangerous developments, the government’s position was clear. They would use all of their resources to deal with these elements, their organization, and their leadership. No government in the world can stand idly by while others take up arms, hesitating and trying to open talks. There is no dialogue or discussion with armed parties until they lay down their arms. Anything else would be destructive to our society and lead it down the wrong path.

Q: President Ali Al-Areed recently said that the care taken to protect human rights led to the expansion of Salafist extremism. Will the government be forced to use the tactics employed by the Ben Ali regime in dealing with Salafist extremists?

There is no comparison with the previous regime. We never took up weapons against the government. We used the pen and the word to get our rights. Our lives and our families were put at risk. We toiled away in prison, out of prison, and abroad; we never took up arms. We didn’t refuse to take up arms because we were unable to: we refused based on our convictions. We had also learned a lesson from other experiences: we should not use weapons to resolve the internal affairs of society. Ennahda was never involved in such activities, whether in Tunisia or abroad. There are instances of political violence which must be dealt with on a societal level through open dialogue.

Q: Sheikh Rachid Ghannouchi once described the Salafists as ‘our sons.’ Has Ennahda since turned its back on the Salafists?

Ennahda should have clarified this issue. The line you do not cross is using weapons. As a party, the movement should believe that it must separate itself from those who would take up arms. However, people have a right to form parties as long as they respect the law. Anyone who challenges it will be met with the full force of the law.

It is no longer acceptable for these groups, religiously influenced or otherwise, to undermine the security of the nation. Individuals, organizations or groups cannot take on the role of protecting security by claiming that they are enjoining good and forbidding evil. This goes for all organizations, militias and councils that want to take the role of the state in defending its citizens. This must be clear, and Shaykh Rachid’s statements were meant to clarify that.

Q: There has been some hesitation by government officials over statements from Algerian officials that they are going to help Tunisia. Is this an insult to Tunisia’s security forces and the army’s ability to maintain security?

On the contrary! We have waited too long for political and security coordination with Algeria. This doesn’t mean that we are weak and calling on other powers for help. Rather, the nature of the problem is border crossings; this affects the whole region. By its nature, terrorism knows no borders or sovereignty. For instance, these elements move from Mount Chambi in Tunisia to Algeria, and on to Mali and Libya. Dealing with this requires coordinating efforts of these countries.

Q: French foreign minister Laurent Fabius visited Tunisia before President Hollande. Did he set down terms that would determine relations between the two countries?

When it comes to cooperation and coordination, the nations of the region alone are not enough: terrorism is an international issue. Naturally, France and America have their interests, but they know that we will not allow any terms or conditions to be placed upon us, especially since the revolution. I don’t think there are any French conditions. France is smarter than to lay down terms. This is simply cooperation and coordination; these visits complement our efforts. We think it is natural to support these relations. Also, our cooperation with France is strategic. Anyone who says something to the contrary doesn’t understand the relations that connect us to France and Europe. They are relations of common interests—social relations. We want clear relations that respect our sovereignty, but that does not conflict with building good relations with European nations. We don’t want to fall into the politics of blocs.

Q: Why doesn’t Tunisia widen its relations with Arab nations, specifically in the Gulf. We see a lot of focus on Qatar, to the point that there is talk of a “Qatari colonization.”

There are relations. I have visited Saudi Arabia twice, once in an official capacity and once unofficially. The current head of the government, Ali Al-Areed, will visit Saudi Arabia. We have an open policy. We want to build relations with all of our neighbors and friends. We are not subservient to any regime. We are open and want to support our relations with Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Kuwait, Egypt and all other governments. The cornerstone of our foreign policy is these relationships. However, we cannot fall into the trap of political whims. Unfortunately, they accuse us of being subservient to Qatar and Turkey. They want to isolate the government and cut off relations with all parties to expend our physical and political resources and undermine the government.

Q: What about the role of the US in Tunisia’s experience with democracy?

America was clear about its support for democracy. In service to my country, I will visit Washington as soon as possible to reiterate the fact that Tunisia needs social, economic and political support. This is not support for a government, but rather support for democracy. President Obama was clear and has understood from the very beginning that supporting Tunisian democracy serves American interests first and foremost, but also the interests of the region as a whole, and the basic political principles the democratic world shares. I’m proud of the relationship with America because it is built upon common interests.

File photo of Turkish Economy Minister Zafer Çağlayan. (AAA)

Ankara, Asharq Al-Awsat—The relationship between Turkey and the European Union has been fiercely contested for 60 years, with some members arguing that Turkey is too poor and not “European” enough to fit in. While once Turkey was seen as the junior partner, the party that was obliged to make all the concessions and changes required by the existing members in order to join the club, the Eurozone crisis and Turkey’s robust economic performance has leveled the playing field in many respects.

Indeed, with high levels of economic growth recorded in recent years, and soon to become debt-free for the first time in over 50 years with its last repayment to the IMF scheduled for this month, Turkish confidence in its economic policy is at an all-time high, despite the ongoing crisis in neighboring Syria.

Accordingly, when Asharq Al-Awsat spoke to Turkey’s minister of economy Zafer Çağlayan this week, he was in an optimistic mood about the performance of the Turkish economy, both now and in the future, and the effect this will have on Turkey’s relations with the EU and the Arab world as both groups grapple with economic and political crises.

The following interview has been edited for length:

Asharq Al-Awsat: Over the past few years, Turkey has seen impressive economic growth, and it seems that Turkey emerged largely unscathed from the economic crisis that struck Europe. What are the reasons for this economic success? How does Turkey view its relationship with the EU?

Zafer Çağlayan: Turkey has made incredible progress over the past ten years, as the economy saw substantial changes during this period. The year 2001 witnessed an enormous crisis after which our government [the Justice and Development Party] came to power. At that time, I was the president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Ankara. Although I’ve long been an industrialist and have held several positions in many different governments, if you told me that Turkey would achieve such growth I would not have believed it. I wouldn’t have dreamed it possible.

There are many factors that helped this growth, though I think they can be boiled down to three things: political stability, the role played by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the economic reforms taken by the government to establish a free economy in Turkey.

Turkey emerged unscathed from the current economic crisis facing Europe because of economic growth, increased exports, and rising employment opportunities. Further, we adopted policies different from those of the EU. Over the last four years, over 4 million people in the EU have lost their jobs and the region has witnessed an economic crisis as its economy shrank considerably. On the other hand, Turkey saw 5 million new jobs created. Our unemployment rate remains lower than that of Europe. In 2011, European economic growth reached 1.5% while Turkish economic growth reached 8.5%. Had Turkey been admitted to the EU as the 28th member state, European economic growth would have reached an average of 1.8% and the unemployment rate would have been lower than its present rate.

It is well known that there are standards that essentially amount to an economic constitution for the European Union which can be condensed to four important factors. The first of these factors is the GDP of the EU states. Turkey’s GDP was better than 23 European nations. Second, the average age of the European population at present ranges between 43–45, while Turkey’s average age is 30, meaning that roughly a fourth of Turkey’s population is under the age of 40. Thirdly, the work week is very regulated in Europe—no more than 37 hours per week and 35 hours per week in France. The average work week in Turkey is currently reaches 45 hours, therefore Turkey possesses a workforce unrivaled in Europe.

Turkey weathered the economic storm that struck Europe and has a number promising opportunities. Our market share has increased. Turkey has become the second-fastest growing in terms of exports worldwide. In the EU, we are the second fastest-growing economy after Estonia. Two years ago, 48% of our exports went to Europe; now, that number has shrunk to 38%. Despite that reduced percentage, Turkish exports continue to increase because of our export growth in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Despite the effects of the Arab Spring, our exports grew at a rate of 13.5% last year thanks to expansionist export policies we have adopted that have allowed us to open new markets in Asia and the Pacific. Currently, Turkish goods are exported to 241 regions around the world. There are two nations we do not export products to: Micronesia and Norway, though we still hope to expand into those markets, which will hopefully occur next year.

Returning to the European Union, we’ve wanted to join for 50 years, but the EU has not been straightforward with us. They have dealt with us hypocritically. They have made visas and transport difficult and do not want to enter into any free trade agreements with Turkey. They do not want to accept Turkey as a third party in any economic agreements with other nations. We have improved in all the economic and democratic criteria. If the EU wants to call itself a Christian club, well, that is another matter altogether.

Q: Today, Turkey is 16th globally in terms of GDP and 15th in terms of purchasing power. Despite this, many European nations classify it as a “growing power.” Despite its elevated economic status, Turkey still does not enjoy the economic rating that many analysts believe it deserves.

We know our strength and what we’re capable of. As I said before, we never dreamed of this ten years ago. As you know, in ten years’ time we will celebrate the centennial of the Turkish Republic. Compared to ten years ago, our GDP has tripled, our exports have quadrupled, and per capita income has tripled. In ten years, we want to maintain and increase this level of growth and development. I can say that international rating agencies have not treated Turkey fairly and have been hypocritical. We are no longer interested in what these agencies have to say. We have been tested, especially through the current economic crisis, and we have passed. The whole world knows this.

The best example of this is the fact that our republic was established in 1923, during which foreign investment in our country amounted to 14.6 billion dollars, until our party took over. Since 2003, that number has grown 8.5 times to 123.7 billion dollars, 75% of which comes from Europe. Why do European investors come to Turkey? They know that there is no place for emotion in investment, only interests. They come looking for secure places for their investments, an effective banking system, and economic and political stability. I have personally worked in exports for 27 years, and I’ve seen examples of that. Turkey is improving its standards and is certainly not the Turkey of ten years ago, nor will it be the same Turkey it is today in ten years’ time. We want economic planning to ensure that our economy is one of the ten largest in the next ten years and can accomplish that. The past decade has proven as much.

Q: It has been said that the reforms that former president Turgut Özal enacted have been the basis for Turkey’s progress, but that he did not have the necessary tools for success during his own time in office. Is this correct?

Turkey has had two different historical periods. In 1923, the great Mustafa Kemal founded the republic. Today, we have a greater understanding of that period, as it was defined by extremely difficult circumstances. After that came the era of former prime minister Adnan Menderes in the 1950s and 1960s who, unfortunately, was the first prime minister to be executed by military coup. At that time, my uncle was a member of parliament and spent a long time in prison as well. Menderes gave a lot to his country.

He was followed by Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, who also did a lot for the nation. Then came Özal. During his tenure, Turkey was opened to the world for the first time. In 1980, exports totaled USD 3 billion. When we took power in 2002, exports were valued at USD 36 billion, while they are currently at USD 152.6 billion. The Özal era saw the first contact with the outside world. I wish he were still alive to see the progress we’ve made. But Özal’s major problems were internal party issues. He did not have an effective team to work with. After him came Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who brought the [AKP] to power.

Turkey is now a different nation entirely. Really, Özal lit the first spark for the change that we’re building upon. Ten years ago, when I spoke to foreigners about Turkey, very few knew where it was or anything about it. Now, everyone knows Turkey.

Q: Has Turkey been negatively affected by the events in the Middle East that began in 2011?

Turkey exported roughly 50% of its exports to Europe, with 25% heading to the Middle East. These are very important nations for us. We have shared interests economically, commercially, ethnically and religiously. We share amazing opportunities. We are economically close to Libya and Tunisia. As for Syria, were it not for all their current problems, our exports to them would total USD 3 billion. Syria is important to us, not only as a market for exports but also as an access point to the Arab world. We exported to nine other countries through Syria. Given the current situation, Syria is unfortunately no longer a viable passageway for these goods.

Yes, the Arab Spring had some negative effects on the Turkish economy, but the people in these nations are fighting for freedom and democracy. Egypt was an important commercial partner, and our relations are currently recovering, as they are in Libya. Were it not for all these problems, Turkish exports would have been higher last year. Regarding Syria, we hope that the Syrian people get the freedom and democracy they yearn for. Turkey will support any measures in this regard. As for Saudi Arabia, we have exceptional relations with them. They are an important commercial partner and we hope to continue our positive relationship.

Q: In Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, there is currently a debate regarding the economic system that should be built, and if it is possible or desirable to ‘Islamicize’ it. What is your advice for these countries?

As part of the Islamic world, we know our true strength. The 57 Islamic countries make up a third of the world’s population and cover a third of its area, although the combined GDP of these nations make up only 6–7% of the world economy and their share of international trade reaches only 5–6%. Commercial trade between these nations is only at 16–15%, while trade within EU nations reaches 75%. The US has important economic ties with Mexico and Canada which total more than USD 500 billion.

As Islamic nations, we lack unity and coordination. We need a system for economic exchange and to establish a free market between us to allow for more shared trade. Turkey has worked hard towards this goal and the president and prime minister have begun talks to move things in this direction. Unfortunately, the Islamic nations fail to realize the importance of the situation. I hope that Turkish efforts will lead to some progress and the Islamic nations can take their rightful place in the world.

Opposition leader Amr Moussa, 76, a former Arab League secretary-general and Egyptian foreign minister, talks to Reuters during an interview in Cairo, April 29, 2013. (REUTERS/Mohamed Abd El Ghany)

Cairo, Asharq Al-Awsat—Amr Moussa, one of the main leader’s of Egypt’s opposition National Salvation Front (NSF), spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat about the forthcoming parliamentary elections in Egypt, the Mursi government, and the Syrian crisis.

A senior Egyptian political and diplomat, Moussa previously served as Secretary-General of the Arab League. He also served as Egypt’s Foreign Minister under the Mubarak regime; he stood in the post-revolutionary Egyptian presidential elections, but lost out to Mohamed Mursi.

Asharq Al-Awsat: How do you view the current situation in Egypt and the Arab World>?

Amr Moussa: Egypt is in a state of turmoil today, while the rest of the Arab world finds itself in a state of uncertainty. In Egypt, we are passing through a transitional stage whose features are indistinct. I believe that those drawing up maps and writing history in the west are preparing to draw up a new map for the Middle East, and a new chapter in its history. This was expected, particularly with the root changes that have taken place in the Arab world. However the problem is the international variables, particularly given Egypt’s absence from the international scene owing to its preoccupation with its own internal crises. Egypt is not in a state of political health granting it the same level of influence [as before]. This is the reason for my distress at this stage.

Q: How can we get out of this state of turmoil in Egypt, not to mention the uncertain state that the rest of the Arab world is experiencing?

Firstly, I call on the government to review the manner in which it is ruling Egypt. The situation today is completely different than when the Muslim Brotherhood movement was first launched; therefore the simple way in which they are ruling, their lack of a vision for the future, and the huge inconsistencies between the government’s day-to-day decisions, has created this unease in Egypt. This situation needs to be completely reviewed in order to avoid witnessing a similar response to that faced by the former regime.

Q: You are one of the leading figures of the Egyptian opposition, and the pro-government supporters are of the view that the NSF is seeking to conspire against the government, describing it as the Jabhat Al-Kharrab (National Destruction Front)?

We are now passing through a transitional phase that is filled with over-the-top rhetoric, They have put forward the terns faloul (remnants of the former regime) and Jabhat Al-Kharrab. However all such discourse is completely unnecessary. The NSF is an opposition front, and in the democratic system the opposition forms part of the legitimacy of the government; at least, those governments that believe in democracy and genuinely practices this. Only when this is understood can there be any development in terms of mutual respect and mutual understanding. There must be new perspectives regarding working together. We have called for the formation of a national unity government but this was not implemented. We called for a transitional government, and this did not happen. We requested guarantees in terms of the elections, and this also did not materialize, however there is a chance that we could make some progress on this last issue.

Q: What progress has there been in terms of guarantees for the NSF to participate in the forthcoming elections?

As long as the elections are postponed, all the previous benefits for this are non-existent. We will wait and see what guarantees there are for the forthcoming elections. Everybody must be aware that participation is normal; boycott is the exception. Boycotting the elections is not out of stubbornness, but there are reasons for this, and we must resolve these reasons.

Q: Observers have begun to see a change in the opposition’s position towards participating in the forthcoming elections. Has this issue been resolved?

I am of the view that there is a move towards participating in the elections, however we have not discussed or decided on any position. I see that a large number of parties have begun to call for participating in the elections and obtaining guarantees [from the government].

Q: Some Egyptians are suspicious about the timing of the elections, and whether these will take place on time. What’s your view of this?

It is true that this suspicion is present, however we are operating on the basis that the elections will take place some time in the future, over the next months, therefore the political parties must prepare for this. The government must also prepare for this, in terms of granting the required guarantees.

Q: Some politicians have accused President Mursi of being stubborn and unable to understand what Egypt and the Egyptian people need today, claiming that this is one of the reasons behind the deteriorating living conditions in Egypt. Do you think president Mursi is intransigent?

I think this is true. If the situation remains the same, along with the continuation of this policy of stubbornness, and in light of the deteriorating economic conditions, then international loans and grant will be of no use to Egypt. We need an economic plan for the future, relying on Egypt’s abundant economic capabilities. However such figures are not participating in government, nor is the government paying any attention to them.

Q: Do you think that president Mursi will call, once again, for national dialogue, with the Egyptian opposition?

It is not a question of dialogue. We previously put forward the idea of forming a national unity government, which the NSF and other members of the opposition would be a part of. Therefore, the issue is not to conduct dialogue for the sake of dialogue; this dialogue must lead to participation in the decision-making process.

Q: You recently visited Lebanon and talked about the unrest that is dominating the Arab scene. Would you say that this unrest includes Beirut?

In Lebanon, the scene is one of mobilization due to the situation in Syria, particularly following the influx of Syrian refugees and the direct impact that the developments in Syria has on the Lebanese scene. I believe that this also applies to Jordan and Iraq as well.

Q: How much impact is the Syrian crisis having on Lebanon?

The impact has gone beyond a state of vulnerability to one of distress; Lebanon’s security situation is in danger, and if there is division in Syria—God forbid—then there will also be division in Lebanon at the same time.

Q: Is there is a solution to the Syrian crisis on the horizon?

I think we are approaching an international deal—a US-Russia deal—within the framework of internal Syrian negotiations between the government and the opposition, Ultimately any solution would be unlikely to include the presence or survival of president Assad. We must also not forget that there are other important dimensions to the crisis, such as Iran, the Sunni-Shiite dimension, as well as other issues relating to Palestinian and Israel. These are huge problems surrounding the Syrian crisis. I also believe that the Syrian crisis is not confined to the so-called Arab Spring phenomenon, and the situation will ultimately end with the redrawing of the regional map.

Q: In your view, how will the regional map be redrawn?

What is happening is the return of the Sykes-Picot Agreement once more, and this is very dangerous, particularly as no Palestinian state has been established yet. This is also taking place at a time when Egypt is internationally absent due to its own preoccupations with its domestic transition, while we are also witnessing regional divisions along sectarian lines and territorial weakness. All of this is very dangerous. Therefore all of these issues are having a negative impact, pushing the region towards danger; there is also a worrying security and economic situation.

Q: Is there any possibility of a tripartite alliance between Egypt, Iran, and Tukrey?

Such an alliance is not likely. Firstly, Turkey and Iran will not ally; they are like oil and water. Turkey has a completely different vision than that of Iran. Secondly, Egypt is in a state of weakness and absence, it cannot get involved in any regional games, while Iran has baggage in terms of its relations with the Arab World, West, and Russia. This is not to mention the Shi’ite dimension and other issues that will not be resolved by the formation of a tripartite alliance, despite all the talk about this.

Q: How would you rate the manner in which the Arabs have dealt with the Syrian crisis?

The Arabs have been preoccupied with the Syrian issue in terms of the Syrian revolution and the regime, rather than from a strategic point of view. Unfortunately they have left this to Russia, the US, and Iran.

File photo of US journalist and writer Lawrence Wright (AAA).

London, Asharq Al-Awsat—Lawrence Wright, Al-Qaeda expert and author of The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11, said that the Riyadh Compound Bombings marked the beginning of a new phase of global terrorism, as well as security coordination between Saudi Arabia and the US.

The Riyadh Compound Bombings saw coordinated suicide attacks targeting three residential compounds in the Saudi capital on May 12, 2003, killing 34 and wounding 149. This infamous attack represented the first Al-Qaeda strike on Saudi territory and the beginning of a fierce conflict between the security authorities and the terrorist organization. This conflict ultimately ended with Al-Qaeda’s expulsion from the kingdom.

Speaking exclusively to Asharq Al-Awsat, Wright revealed that “months before the attack on the Riyadh compound, there had been signs that a major attack was coming in Saudi Arabia. The country had become a seedbed for radicalism and the US State Department had issued travel advisories to its citizens in the Arabian Peninsula.”

In fact, the Saudi Interior Ministry issued a list of 19 most wanted terrorists on May 7, 2003—just five days prior to the Riyadh attacks. This list included a number of those with ties to this infamous terrorist act, most prominently Al-Qaeda leaders Khalid Hajj, Abdulaziz Al-Muqrin, and Turki Al-Dandani. It was the Dandani cell that was responsible for the compound bombings.

As for what lessons Saudi Arabia learned from this attack, Wright said: “The main lesson that the Saudis learned from this event was that their policy of tolerating Islamist radicals was dangerous and self-defeating. After that [the compound bombing], the Saudis cracked down ruthlessly.”

However the Riyadh Compound Bombings—targeting the Al-Hamra Oasis Village, the Vinelli Corporation Compound and the Dorrat Al-Jadawel compound—did not just affect Saudi Arabia, but the whole international scene. At this point, the US was in the middle of a controversial “war on terror”, and the effects of the Riyadh bombings were felt across the region, and as far afield as Washington.

Wright told Asharq Al-Awsat: “The lesson for America was different. The primary reason Al Qaeda gave in targeting Western compounds was the presence of American troops inside the country, but only days before the US government announced that it was withdrawing American forces, eliminating the most obvious provocation. At the time, the decision had been criticized as appeasement toward Al Qaeda, even though it was a move that should have been made years before.”

Most analysts believe that Al-Qaeda shot themselves in the foot with the Riyadh Compound Bombings, and Wright concurs.

“When Al Qaeda attacked anyway, it became clear that there was no point in appeasement or negotiation with Bin Laden and his movement. The terrorist leader had hoped to put a wedge between his country and the West, but after the attacks in Riyadh the Saudis and the Americans worked together more closely than ever,” he added.

Wright has spent 35 years of his career investigating Al-Qaeda and former leader Osama Bin Laden. He interviewed more than 500 of Bin Laden’s acquaintances, relatives, and friends, as well as officials from twenty different countries. He published The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 in 2006 which won the Pulitzer Prize for Non-Fiction. In this book, Wright looks at Al-Qaeda activities leading up to the 9/11 attacks.

File photo of Brian Fishman. (AAA)

London, Asharq Al-Awsat—In the week of the tenth anniversary of the Riyadh Compound Bombings, Asharq Al-Awsat spoke to US counter-terrorism expert Brian Fishman on the implications this attack had on the domestic, and global, war on terror.

Brian Fishman is a counter-terrorism research fellow at the New American Foundation, he is also a Fellow with the Combatting Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, having previously served as CTC’s Director of Research.

Fishman is the author of a number of studies on terrorism and Al-Qaeda in particularly, including investigations into Al-Qaeda’s foreign fighters in Iraq.

The Riyadh Compound Bombings saw coordinated suicide attacks against three residential compounds frequented by westerners in eastern Riyadh on May 12, 2003, killing 34 and wounding 149. This represented the first Al-Qaeda strike on Saudi territory and the beginning of a fierce conflict between Saudi security authorities and the terrorist organization that ultimately saw Al-Qaeda withdraw to neighboring Yemen.

Asked whether these suicide bombings marked the beginning of the end for Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, Fishman acknowledged that “this hammered home, for the Saudi government, the risk represented by Al-Qaeda and similar groups domestically.”

Fishman said: “The crackdown by the Saudi government in general was very effective. Since that time, there has been increased cooperation on an intelligence-level. Therefore, I think it is important to understand that while 19 of the 9/11 hijackers were Saudi nationals, and you still see fundraising and those kinds of activities in Saudi Arabia, since 2003 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have largely been pushed into Yemen.”

“The Saudi government has been instrumental in helping manage and understand the threat from that particular Al-Qaeda branch,” he added.

Commenting on reported ties between Al-Qaeda and Iran, Fishman told Asharq Al-Awsat: “There have been many reports of Bin Laden family members being present in Iran, including Suleiman Abu Ghaith, who was just arrested and is now in the US, among others.”

“The order to attack in 2003 was reportedly given by Saif Al-Adel who at the time was in Iran,” he added.

Fishman emphasized: “The relationship between Al-Qaeda figures living in Iran and the Iranian government is one of the great mysteries of the last ten years or so. This is because there have been times when those figures have been able to contribute operationally, including in 2003 in Saudi Arabia, while at the same time we know that Al-Qaeda and Iran have very different goals and ideologies. They don’t have the same vision of the world.”

“We can see that in Syria today where the Iranian government is backing the Assad regime and Al-Qaeda is working with some of the rebel groups,” he added.

As for Bin Laden’s killing in 2011, and hopes that this would spell the end of global terrorism, Fishman said: “I think the ideology doesn’t go away; the ideology remains. I think that the threat from Al-Qaeda central has declined substantially but implicitly there has been a trade-off made by the west by intervening directly in the heart of the Islamic world, whether we are talking about Afghanistan or Iraq.”

“Over time, the ability of the US to put pressure on AQAP in Yemen for example, has reduced its ability to conduct an attack from the outside into the US or the West in general. However, this [also] raises the risk from Muslims living in the west who may feel like they need to do something—although obviously that is extremely rare in the grand scheme of things,” he added.

However Fishman emphasized that “the vast majority of American or British Muslims are well integrated into society; they are just everyday people, living their lives, taking care of their kids.”

He affirmed that “I do think that the strategy that we have taken has downfalls. It has upsides too, it reduces the risk of those attacks from outside the country but it increases the risk that there will be domestic radicalization.”

Ambassador James C. Swan, the US Special Representative for Somalia, in London on May 7, 2013. (US State Department)

London, Asharq Al-Awsat—Somalia has long been viewed as the quintessential “failed state,” an anarchic territory plagued by the legacies of colonialism, Cold War geopolitics, dictatorship, devastating famines, secessionist movements and insurgents.

Recently, efforts have been made by the international community to push the pieces of the fractured country back together. Wary of the consequences of allowing the Horn of Africa to become a source of instability, radical Islamist terrorism and maritime piracy, Somalia’s neighbors and their international backers have sought to assist Somalian attempts to recreate a functioning government.

This week has seen the new Somalian government, in partnership with the UK, seek to capitalize on the momentum from this push from the international community. A major conference took place in London on Tuesday, with delegates from Somalia and international organizations like the IMF and the UN, to agree on measures to support the new government’s plans for tackling Somalia’s crippling political, economic and social problems.

During a break in the conference, Asharq Al-Awsat spoke to the US Special Representative to Somalia, Ambassador James Swan, about American views of the situation in the country, US concerns about the threat of terrorism, and what the US is doing to help.

Asharq Al-Awsat: What was your impression of the conference?

Ambassador James Swan: I think the conference has been very successful in accomplishing what it was intended to do, which is primarily to carry forward the momentum realized in Somalia realized over the past year to two years—momentum on the security front, momentum in terms of putting in place new political institutions, momentum in terms of, frankly, seeing Somalia rejoin the international community as a active member. This conference builds on the London conference of last year, but with a focus this time much more on Somali ownership and development of strategies in key areas with the expectation that the international community will align behind those strategies.

Q: Some civil society groups have criticized the fact that not many of them and their colleagues have been invited to the conference. Do you have any opinion on that?

The conference is co-hosted by the UK and the Somali governments; I think there was an active effort on the part of the Somali government to ensure that as the representative of the Somali people it was speaking for that community, but in terms of the specific attendance I don’t have a lot of detail about it—exactly how these delegates were selected.

Q: What kind of response do you have to criticisms that conferences like this one are elite-led and top-down, rather than bottom-up and seeking to involve input from social groups and people with more local concerns, or specific issues like clean water or gender-based violence?

Again, the conference is co-led by the Somali government, a government that emerged from the most representative process that we have seen in 25 years, with the selection of a parliament through a clan-based selection process, indirect election of the president and the like. So one of the key objectives is to move to an arrangement in which there is a sovereign Somali voice speaking for the Somali people.

Beyond that, the issues that are being addressed at this conference are issues that are important to individual Somali citizens, issues of security—both of overall security and human security—and issues related to justice, the rule of law and ending impunity, issues related to reconstruction of the country, including restoration of basic social services and, indeed, particular focus on addressing issues of sexual and gender-based violence, and ensuring that concern for those issues is fully embedded in efforts at improving the justice system and making the national security forces both more effective and more accountable.

Q: What is your opinion of the progress of the new Federal Somali Government since it transitioned from a Transitional Federal Government? Do you think this has reflected changes in its capabilities on the ground, or is this just a change of name?

Again, this is the most representative government we have seen in more than 20 years in Somalia. It is, however, a government that has taken over after some 20 years of conflict and the deep fragility of the state, and in many ways has taken over responsibility for a country that is largely broken. So what we have seen over the past six to seven months of this new government is an active effort to choose a capable new people to be playing critical roles in the cabinet, and other senior positions.

They have continued to work to reach out to neighboring countries, they have begun the important work of reaching out to key regional actors within Somalia, other regions of the country, and they have now developed an effective set of strategies for dealing with the most important challenges confronting the country.

That includes security, that includes justice, it includes public accountability and financial management, it includes stabilization, it includes reinitegration of Al-Shaba’ab defectors, and the like. I think they are facing a daunting set of challenges and are off to a strong start, though it is still early days in what is going to be a place of huge challenges going forward.

Q: Let us turn to the security situation in Somalia. What is the US government’s opinion of the threat posed by Al-Shaba’ab?

I think Al-Shaba’ab has seen its influence wane in Somalia, and by extension elsewhere in the region over the past two years. The trajectory with regards to Al-Shaba’ab’s power and reach continues to be negative for that movement. It has lost territory over that period of time. Initially, it was pushed out of the capital and then other important urban areas, and key ports, including the loss of Kismayo, its most important center of revenue generation, last September and October. So the overall trend lines we think are good, in terms of the reducing the importance and effectiveness of Al-Shaba’ab.

That said, it remains a dangerous movement, and we have seen that as it turns to terrorist-style, asymmetric attack it continues to be a deadly force, but we frankly think that those attacks underscore that its vision of Somalia is a dark vision, it is a vision that is not embraced by the Somali people, and that the efforts by the government and the supporters of the government to improve the lot of Somalis is going to further degrade support for Al-Shaba’ab.

Q: As you said, Al-Shaba’ab has lost territory and become a more rootless terrorist movement, as shown by the latest bombings. Is it not the case that this makes it more dangerous in some ways?

It remains a brutal organization that is certainly capable of killing and has shown that it is prepared to do so. However, its tactics and indeed its broader operations have shifted from what two years ago was the ability to control and effectively administer significant parts of the urban core of southern Somalia.

That ability has been largely been degraded over the past two years, and now it’s left with little more than the ability to conduct these brutal terrorist attacks.

Q: Obviously, the gains in security and stability made in Somalia could be reversed. Do you think Al-Shaba’ab has the ability to reconstitute itself if this happens, or is it definitively beaten?

I think Al-Shaba’ab has lost support among the Somali people because of its draconian style of administering territory. Its measures are, in many cases, contrary to Somali tradition and culture, and frankly it has demonstrated brutality in how it has dealt with its own people.

It is clear, however, that further sustained progress in confronting Al-Shaba’ab has to be multi-pronged—and that means continued effort on the security side, in terms of building up Somali military capability, and supporting African peacekeepers that are operating inside Somalia in support of the government, so there is a security prong.

There’s a crucial stabilization and reconstruction prong, essentially in terms of demonstrating that, in areas that have been recovered from Al-Shaba’ab, life is getting better under the new authorities, and that means local infrastructure, it means service delivery, it means provision of social support that was lacking under Al-Shaba’ab but also has been largely absent in conflict-ridden Somalia for the last twenty years. The third prong is really governance and stability, at the level of the national administration and the federal entities, and in essence its necessary for progress that was made on governance last year to be sustained and continued to show a positive alternative to Al-Shaha’ab and to show that Al-Shaba’ab’s message truly has no resonance in contrast to the progress being made by the government.

Q: The UN says that there has not been a successful pirate attack in several months. Is the US planning to do anything to address the causes that lead Somalians to take up piracy? This obviously connects with the last issue we were talking about, with regards to the three “prongs” that address the problems that cause people turn to Al-Shaba’ab. What is the US doing to progress on this issue?

There has been significant progress on counter-piracy efforts for a host of reasons, including international patrolling of international waters that are used by ships in those areas. Also, we’ve seen effective prosecutions—increased prosecutions of pirates who are captured during operations and have been brought to justice in multiple countries, including in east Africa. The shipping industry has taken a much more active role in counter-measures to abort its vessels to dissuade pirates. Some of these are as simple as evasive maneuvers and posting watchmen, and they’ve been quite effective.

But clearly a critical piece will be improved stability and development on land in Somalia. We are active and supportive of nation-wide efforts to support AMISOM [the African Union Mission in Somalia] and to support Somali military forces. In addition to that, we have a very active program to support stabilization operations inside Somalia, including projects in five communities that in the past have been affected—badly affected—by pirates in Puntland, and of course we continue to provide extensive diplomatic and other support to the Somali government as it tries to improve governance.

Q: Could you tell us about the US assistance program to the Somalian government?

Certainly. Again, this is aligned behind Somali government priorities, but it includes support to the Somali National Army, as requested by the government, in areas of salary support, in areas of food, fuel, and other material support and some equipment as well to support Somali government operations.

We also obviously are supportive of the African Union Mission in Somalia. It’s an internationally backed peacekeeping operation. But in our case, we have provided pre-deployment training and equipment for African Union troop-contributing countries. We contribute, through the United Nations support office for AMISOM, additional support for that mission.

Q: The Somali federal government has recently spoken about an outreach program to try to lure back people from Al-Shaba’ab and reconcile them with the new state-building project. Does the US have an opinion on this policy?

The Somali government, as part of the preparations for this conference, has launched what it calls the “Disengaged Fighters and At Risk Youth Program,” and the intent of that is to look at ways in which young Al-Shaba’ab fighters, who either are captured or wish on their own to turn themselves in, opt to return to their communities.

It established certain processes led by the Somali government for accepting those youths and working with communities so they can indeed go home and be reintegrated. The expectation is that most of these youths are not ideologically committed. They have joined Al Shaba’ab for other reasons—sense of community, solidarity, financial reasons, et cetera, and [it is expected] that it will be possible for them to return to their homes and rejoin their communities. We think that that’s an important set of initiatives to be undertaken by the government that wants support.

Q: In the case of some of the fighters, who may be more ideologically committed, if they begin talks with the government, would the US support that move?

I think, ultimately, we’re going to take our cue from the Somali government in terms of what makes sense as far as political outreach to any of the communities within Somalia. I think we are mindful of how brutal Al-Shaba’ab has been and I think that no entity or organization knows that more than the Somali government.

But ultimately, issues of internal reconciliation—issues of internal Somali politics—must be addressed by Somali political entities that were created, and made more representative than we’ve seen in a generation, last year.

Q: One final question: As I’m sure you’re aware, there was the recent UN report released on the famine that took place in 2011. A quarter of a million Somalis are reported to have died. What measures is the US taking to help avoid such things in the future?

Well, it’s a great tragedy, of course, that so many Somalis perished in this recent famine—the first famine of the 21st century. In response to that, the international community mobilized very actively. The US alone has contributed more than USD 360 million in humanitarian assistance during that period, and so there was a very active international response.

Frankly, we were badly restricted in terms of our ability to respond because most of the zones that were most severely affected by the famine in which the highest death rates occurred were those controlled by Al-Shaba’ab. During the course of the famine, access was restricted in those areas, and indeed some 16 humanitarian organizations were expelled by Al-Shaba’ab even once the famine had begun.

I think we all recognize that we need to learn some lessons from this and do better in the future. The US and others are committed to a focus on a new strategy for resilience in which our efforts of course have to be focused on short-term life saving, but also work more to build the capability of the Somali population to withstand shocks in the future.

In that regard, the London conference in only one in a sequence of important international events this year that will focus on building international support for Somalia. In addition to this conference, in Japan at the end of May there will be development focused conference, the Tokyo International Conference of African development. Then in September the European Union will host a conference with a specific emphasis on longer term development support and strategies for Somalia.

So I think this reinforces the commitment of international partners to look for ways to address not only short term problems but also put in place a development agenda that’s going to support Somalia in the future.

File photo of former Egyptian presidential legal adviser Fouad Gadallah. (AAA)

Cairo, Asharq Al-Awsat—In his first interview since resigning as Egyptian presidential adviser for legal affairs, Dr. Mohamed Fouad Gadallah was keen to stress that the crisis between the Egyptian government and judiciary can be resolved.

Speaking exclusively to Asharq Al-Awsat, Gadallah lifted the veil on the activity at the Egyptian presidential palace, revealing that the harried President Mursi fears the appointment of a charismatic and ambitious prime minister, and that the Muslim Brotherhood often intervenes in government decisions.

However, he emphasized that the president is no stooge, saying that Mursi had gone against Brotherhood wishes on a number of occasions, including when Mursi rescinded his controversial constitutional decree under public pressure.

Fouad Gadallah received a doctorate in Human Rights from Cairo University in 2010; he currently works as the vice-chairman of the State Council.

He resigned as President Mursi’s adviser for legal affairs on April 24, citing differences with the regime, particularly regarding Cairo’s recent rapprochement with Iran.

Asharq Al-Awsat: Parliament is in the process of discussing a bill to amend the judicial authority law, which has created a crisis between the judiciary and the executive and legislative branches. What is your view of the situation?

Fouad Gadallah: Every national government has three branches—the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the judicial branch. No nation can be fully stable while there is a conflict between these different branches. What we are witnessing in Egypt right now is a problem of trust between the judiciary and the other two branches. Accusations are being tossed around: the judiciary feels that the executive and legislature are conspiring against it, which is not true—at least, not to the point of conspiracy. In turn, the executive and legislative branches feel that the judiciary is conspiring against them, a fear that is equally exaggerated.

Q: But the issue has gone beyond a crisis of trust. Figures within the ruling party are leveling blunt accusations that the judiciary contains corrupt holdovers from the previous regime who are seek to delegitimize President Mursi. Is that correct?

The judiciary was and is based on integrity, neutrality and independence, just like the Armed Forces. It is the least corrupt state institution, although this does not mean that it free of flaws. There are definitely some issues that need adjusting, such as the appointment of judges and the judicial review process, which needs to be enacted to bring oversight to the judiciary’s actions.

Still, these are institutions that must be reformed from within—reform should not be imposed from the outside.

Q: Is this not precisely what proponents of the new judicial authority draft law are calling for right now in the Shura Council?

No. The judiciary will not be reformed by amending the current law. First and foremost, the judicial branch must desire reform; then—and only then—can pertinent legislation be enacted.

Q: Who is to blame for this crisis, and why is the executive branch being accused of attacking the independence of the courts?

When I’m asked questions such as this, I like to bring up the issue of the [mandatory retirement] age of the judges: is it 60 or 70? Even if this is what created the current crisis, now is not the right time to discuss the issue. The current Shura Council is unqualified to consider the draft amendment of the judicial authority law. You cannot simply rule that all judges over age of 60 are corrupt; on the contrary, these are senior judges with vast experience.

Q: Yet in talking about the independence of the three branches of government, is it within the judiciary’s purview to prevent parliament from performing its role in drafting laws?

We do not aim to prevent the Shura Council from going about its duties, but we demand that they work according to the constitution, which stipulates that the Shura Council replaces the House of Representatives during the transitional period. The judiciary does not interfere in the enacting of legislation, except when it is absolutely necessary. Is it absolutely necessary to lower the age of the judges right now? No. There are only political reasons for this.

Q: One of the accusations directed at the judiciary is that it hampered the transitional period, acquitted prominent figures of the former regime, and prevented the martyrs of the revolution from receiving justice, and this is why reform must be enacted quickly. Do you agree with this?

This is not true. Even if there were suspicions surrounding some judicial figures, this does not mean that the entire institution ought to be dismantled and all senior judges forced to resign. Judges rule based on the available evidence and documents, so if the agencies responsible for collecting information failed in their duties, then the judge is not to blame. The problem does not lie with the judiciary but with these auxiliary bodies, with the evidence, and with the investigations.

Q: Some of the judges have proposed internationalizing the crisis, given that Egypt is a signatory to international conventions that require it to preserve the independence of the judiciary. What is your view?

The judges of Egypt are capable of protecting the judicial branch without resorting to foreign assistance. This would be a sign of weakness, and the judicial branch in Egypt is certainly not weak. We reject any indication or threat of internationalizing the crisis. Egypt cannot open its doors to foreign intervention in its internal affairs.

Q: Is it possible that the judiciary could undergo Ikhwanization?

This matter has been exaggerated. No one can Ikhwanize the judiciary, nor dare to interfere in its operations. Even if 4,000 judges were removed, as some suggest, those under age the age of 60 [who remain] will be even more difficult to influence. It is not true, as some believe, that those younger than 60 are more pliable—they are the fiercest members of the judiciary.

There are always exaggerated reports, and the Muslim Brotherhood is not as bad as some make them out to be—just as they are not as righteous as others imagine them to be. Those who speak of the Brotherhood’s intentions to grant the Sinai to Hamas or sell Egypt to Qatar are crazy. No one can challenge the loyalty and patriotism of the Brotherhood. I have spent time with them and I know them well. Still, they can be criticized for their mistakes. At the same time as this, no one can challenge the patriotism of the opposition.

Q: So what is the solution to this crisis?

The solution is for the political parties to withdraw the proposed amendments to the judicial authority law, and to defer any discussion of the matter until after parliamentary elections. They should then consult the judiciary on any planned amendment, according to the constitution, which stipulates that parties affected by legislation must be consulted. The legislative branch is bound by law to do so; it is not a matter of choice.

Q: Why does the president insist on keeping public prosecutor Talaat Abdallah in his post, despite the strong disapproval of the opposition and a ruling that voided the dismissal of his predecessor?

The way I see it, President Mursi is not insisting on keeping Talaat Abdallah, but he is worried about him being removed. He sincerely wants to resolve this conflict, because it is not in the interest of the state to create a crisis with the judiciary. The upcoming parliamentary elections require judicial oversight, and the judges cannot be forced to participate if they do not agree to it.

Therefore, President Mursi has to be an arbitrator between the branches. He needs to open up serious, constructive dialogue between the Supreme Judicial Council, current public prosecutor Talaat Abdallah, and former public prosecutor Abdel Meguid Mahmoud.

The situation could see Talaat Abdallah resigning and being given a political post [as a minister or governor]. Abdel Meguid Mahmoud would also be placated, dropping his case despite the ruling demanding his return. Then, the president and the Supreme Judicial Council can agree on the appointment of a new public prosecutor.

Q: How true are the claims that the Muslim Brotherhood is interfering with the decisions of the president’s administration?

This is not true at all. In the Presidential Palace, there is a mechanism for making decisions based on consultation. The president consults everyone, including the Muslim Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau, as is his right, and then he makes decisions. Sometimes he heeds of their opinion; sometimes he does not.

Other times things can happen far removed from the presidency, such as local administrative appointments that the president knows little about. These will happen when the Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau or one of its members intervenes, and thus the appointment is made without the president’s knowledge.

Perhaps these appointments would be within the Muslim Brotherhood’s rights if the country was in a natural state, and not its current, post-revolutionary state of political instability, but now is not the time for them to take exclusive control of these decisions. The Muslim Brotherhood gets involved in everything, large and small, and issues statements on everything, causing a crisis for the state administration.

Q: Has President Mursi ever gone against the opinion of the Muslim Brotherhood?

Yes. This happened, for example, when he decided to rescind the constitutional decree he issued last November. When the Muslim Brotherhood rejected the repeal of the decree, the president went his own way.

Q: Most of the presidential aides who have resigned complained that they were not being consulted. Why did you feel unable to continue your post any longer, and decide to tender your resignation?

With all due respect to them, those who resigned previously were far from the actual decision-making process. They were not based in the Presidential Palace; their offices were elsewhere. My situation is different, because I spent most of my days in the Presidential Palace, and I always met with the president. Therefore, I was involved in some of the decision-making. The president was not obligated to follow all of my advice, but he listened and formed his own opinions as he pleased.

I felt that the administration’s vision was amorphous. There is no vision or timetable; instead, you have an insistence upon having a prime minister who lacks political and economic experience, one group monopolizing political power in the midst of an ongoing economic collapse, the security vacuum, attempts to dismantle the judicial branch and undermine its independence. These are all negative things.

Q: Why does the president insist on keeping Hisham Qandil as prime minister despite the opposition of the majority of the political forces?

Frankly, the new constitution gives the prime minister a lot of powers. Thus, if there were a prime minister who had a clear vision and charisma, in addition to political, economic and administrative skills, he could potentially play a larger role in the management of the nation, and thus compete with the president.

Q: Some describe your resignation as jumping off a sinking ship. What is your view of this characterization?

I left the president’s office once the situation had stabilized. I left during the best, most stable period that the nation has seen in a while. For the record, I deferred my resignation for five months because of the wave of strikes that the nation was experiencing.

Q: So would you characterize Egypt as being stable now?

Yes, at least more than it was before, in terms of movement on the streets. The ship is not sinking, as some claimed. The purpose of my resignation was to shed light on some negative issues, and for everyone to reconsider their take on these issues.

Q: Do you regret anything about your time in the office of the presidency, such as being blamed for mistakes for which you were not responsible?

No. On the contrary, I learned a lot. Despite being blamed for others’ mistakes, I publicly took full responsibility for my part in the decision to reinstate parliament, as well as for my rejection of President Mursi’s constitutional declaration issued last November, which caused a schism in the street. I say this in the hope that everyone would bear responsibility, re-evaluate their positions, address their mistakes, and apologize to the people.

Q: Is there any chance of your joining the opposition National Salvation Front?

No, that’s not possible. I will not join any [political] entity, ruling or opposition. I have returned to the people once more. Even the opposition is divided. Some challenge the legitimacy of the president and demand early presidential elections, which is a mistake. Others want reform, which is the right thing to do. I am in favor of the president completing his four-year term, and any early presidential elections are not in the nation’s interest. Those who call for early elections are calling for bloodshed in the streets.

Q: Currently, the Supreme Constitutional Court is looking at the legitimacy of the Shura Council. Is there any chance that this will be dissolved, in the same manner that the lower house of parliament was?

I do not think that the Shura Council will be dissolved, because the new constitution grants the Shura Council immunity. This is my legal opinion, although some may disagree.

Q: President Mursi has often talked about conspiracies that aim to overthrow him and the government. How much truth is there to such allegations?

These are all exaggerated. There might be some truth to them, and there have been some attempts, but they have been blown out of proportion. This is similar to the opposition’s exaggerated accusations that the Brotherhood is conspiring against Egypt. Sometimes inaccurate information gets to the president from an unreliable source, something which is not in any way unique to Egypt. The Iraq War was an example of this, where a source was unprofessional, and sometimes mistakes are made.

Q: One of the reasons for your resignation was Egypt’s rapprochement with Iran. Why did you oppose this?

I am only against opening Egypt’s doors to Iranian tourism, which will lead to the spread of Shi’ism and the building of Shi’ite mosques, as well as the exploitation of some Egyptians to spread Iranian ideology. I welcome a new political relationship with Iran, but not at the expense of Egyptian national security and our relationship with the Gulf. Our priority for national security is our relationship with the Gulf states. Therefore, there are flaws in our foreign policy towards Iran that need to be reevaluated and corrected.

Jordanian information minister Muhammad Al-Momeni. (AAA File photo)

Having won the election in January and survived a confidence vote in the Jordanian parliament on April 24, Ensour’s new government is finally able to begin policy-making in earnest. As Jordan embarks on this new stage of its development, Asharq Al-Awsat spoke with the country’s information minister, Muhammad Al-Momeni, on the new political structure, the economy and the Syrian crisis.

The following interview has been edited for length:

Q: The government has won the vote of confidence in parliament. Can you give us your opinion on the week of debates that preceded the vote?

Thanks to the impartial parliamentary elections, a new reality has formed in Jordanian political life. There is a strong and effective parliament which plays a basic role in the Jordanian scene. Anyone who watched the debate leading up to the confidence vote could see an example of how Jordanian democracy should be. We have witnessed political discourse that is committed to the affairs of homeland and citizens and seeks to strengthen the role of the legislative authority as a main part of the constitutional authority in Jordan.

Jordanians eagerly watched the parliamentary talks, not because they demand better services (despite their importance), but because they wanted to make sure that the speeches expressed their political demands in a way that reflects the debates over reform taking place in the street. Moreover, the fact that MPs are split between supporters and oppositionists is a confirmation of the democratic reforms achieved so far.

Parliamentary debates strengthen democracy in Jordan and offer an opportunity for people to take the country to a level that everyone aspires to, so as to achieve the desired progress and modernization. It must be emphasized that the debates were based on responsible political programs, reflecting Jordan’s distinctive parliamentary procedures that stress the real values of democracy, which we encourage in our country.

Q: The prime minister spoke about a cabinet reshuffle that will take place shortly. Do you know when the consultations on this will begin? Will there be MPs in the cabinet?

To start, I must emphasize that both the formation and amendment of the government are the prerogative of His Majesty, King Abdullah II. The prime minister announced before the parliament that there is an urgent move to form the parliamentary government as quickly as possible. We can say that the government line-up, which only includes a limited number of ministers, is an indication of the prime minister’s tendency toward the changes in government. The prime minister announced on Jordanian national TV that once the king returns from the US, he will ask for His Majesty’s permission to consult with the parliamentary entities involved in the preparations for a cabinet reshuffle. Here, I must emphasize again the cooperation between the government and the MPs in forming the parliamentary government: it confirms the parliamentary aspect of the political system, as set out in the constitution. This requires the involvement of MPs so that the parliamentary majority forms a government.

Q: Jordan is experiencing relative political calm at the moment. Does the government have any plans to start a dialogue with the Islamist movements and the other popular movements to reach a consensus on the priorities of political reform?

When it comes to dialogue, it must be noted that the king’s letter of appointment [decree authorizing the formation of the government] stressed that strengthening the consultative approach requires dialogue with the different political factions. The government will indeed start such dialogues, because of its obligation to implement the letter of appointment. It is also motivated by the government’s belief that national dialogue is necessary to reach a consensus. It is an effective means of reaching legal and political formulas needed for the process of reform, particularly in the laws of elections and political party formation. As a part of its vision to promote a collective dialogue in the country, the government is willing to submit to the parliament an initiative concerning the one-vote law and election laws. In addition, the government is obligated by the constitution to promote public freedom and freedom of the press, as these help monitor government organizations.

Q: How do you assess the international community’s response to the influx of Syrian refugees into Jordan? Does your country have the capacity to accommodate the large number of refugees?

The impact of the Syrian crisis is threatening Jordan’s national security. Based on this reality, Jordan went to the UN Security Council to emphasize the UN’s humanitarian and security responsibilities. We drew attention to the fact that Jordan is facing a serious humanitarian situation that is threatening its security and stability due to the constant influx of Syrian refugees, whose number has exceeded 500,000. Under Article 35(1) of the UN Charter, Jordan requested that the UN Security Council to consider what the country is facing as a threat to international security and peace and that the UN should urgently intervene and provide the financial support required to enable Jordan to address the serious impact of the influx of Syrian refugees. Jordan also urged the international community to take clear measures to improve the crisis.

During His Majesty’s visit to the US, King Abdullah II showed keen interest in the Syrian crisis and the issue of the Syrian refugees. For its part, the US endorsed how Jordan has, in spite of its size and limited resources, opened its borders to the refugees who enter the country in enormous numbers due to the humanitarian situation in Syria.

Q: The GCC has been providing economic support to Jordan, mainly by investing in infrastructure development projects. Is the helping to end the country’s economic crisis?

A number of projects included in the budget are funded by the GCC grant to Jordan. In this context and on behalf of the Jordanian government, I appreciate the fraternal stance of the GCC countries. I would also like to take the opportunity to thank the Iraqi government for its cooperation in the issue of the oil pipeline and for promoting our agricultural products.

The Jordanian government is counting on the GCC grants, as well as on international donors, to increase capital expenditures and to address the imbalances resulting from high prices of energy. If we can address these issues, it will increase the economic growth rate.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe being greeted by Saudi officials upon his arrival in Riyadh on April 30, 2013.
(AFP PHOTO/HO/SPA )

Riyadh, Asharq Al-Awsat—Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe arrived in Saudi Arabia on Tuesday in his first official visit to the Kingdom. The prime minister met with Saudi Crown Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz in Jeddah, and during their meeting the two confirmed the strength of Saudi–Japanese bilateral relations and discussed ways to bolster ties.

Abe said, “We want to expand Japan’s ties with Saudi Arabia, from energy to the fields of politics and security.”

In an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat during his visit, Prime Minister Abe emphasized that “Japan traditionally enjoys excellent relations with the Middle East,” adding, “We confirm that Japan is an old friend to the Arab world, and we hope from this visit to build a comprehensive partnership with the countries of the Middle East and develop relations on a number of different levels.”

As for the details of this Japanese–Arab partnership, Abe said: “First, this includes strengthening relations in the political arena in order to achieve regional stability and strengthen economic ties, including in the field of energy, in addition to strengthening relations in the field of cultural exchange.”

The Japanese prime minister also stressed that “Japan and the Arab world enjoy very close relations. When the huge tsunami struck eastern Japan, the Arab states provided us with a huge amount of aid, and we will never forget this.”

Commenting on the Arab Spring, Abe told Asharq Al-Awsat that “over the past years, the Middle East has witnessed huge changes; however, this has not affected Japan’s position in principle. We will remain sincere partners to the Arab states, and we will continue to stand together.”

The Japanese prime minister said that he wanted to focus on two issues regarding future Japanese–Arab relations, namely that “the stability of the Arab region has a direct effect on world stability, and, second, that we are seeking to build a comprehensive partnership.”

He added: “Japan will continue to provide strong support to the Middle Eastern countries that are looking for a way to achieve stability and prosperity after they witnessed revolutions and change.

“The stability of the Middle East is directly tied to international stability, and the same applies to Japanese security.”

He revealed that “Japan has provided USD 80 million as emergency humanitarian aid … to aid the people of Syria and the surrounding states.”

Regarding the disturbing situation continuing to unfold in Syria, the Japanese prime minister said: “We believe that President Bashar Al-Assad remaining in power hampers the smooth transition of power.

“If the situation continues to develop in the same manner, this increases fears regarding the influence of the extremists in the post-Assad era.”

He told Asharq Al-Awsat: “The international community must come together and support the opposition’s unification in order to find a solution to this situation.”

Abe described the stalled Palestinian–Israeli peace process as a “historical goal for the region,” adding, “the resumption of the peace talks is now more urgent than ever before.

“Japan continues to exert political effort, in cooperation with the international community, to call the concerned parties to resume talks to reach a two-state solution.”

File photo of Egyptian information minister Salah Abdel-Maksoud. (AAA)

Cairo, Asharq Al-Awsat—It is the second time in less than a year that Asharq Al-Awsat has paid a visit to Cairo’s Maspero building, headquarters of Egypt’s Radio and Television Union (ERTU), to meet with Egyptian information minister Salah Abdel-Maksoud. He works out of the same ninth-floor office that had previously been the domain of his Mubarak-era predecessors, Safwat El-Sherif and Anas El-Fiqqi. However, this time, Asharq Al-Awsat had to wait before being ushered into Abdel-Maksoud’s office: he was busy performing evening prayers.

The minister of information is a bona fide member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Behind his desk, the customary portrait of former president Hosni Mubarak has been replaced with a plaque that reads, “Without God, I Cannot Succeed.” To the minister’s left is a giant screen divided into 16 smaller screens displaying thirteen domestic and three satellite television channels. Abdel-Maksoud does not conceal his Brotherhood colors; however, he emphasizes that “I take off my Brotherhood hat at Maspero’s doors.”

This interview has been edited for length:

Asharq Al-Awsat: What is the latest news on the Media Code of Ethics?

Abdel-Maksoud: On March 30 last year, a number of satellite channel owners and other prominent people in the media, including ERTU representatives, were invited to a meeting in which several issues were discussed, including the Media Code of Ethics. All invitations were accepted, and therefore this was a highly inclusive meeting during which representatives from the various television channels, newspapers and radio stations discussed the Code of Ethics. From the outset, we emphasized that the Code of Ethics should not be imposed on those working in the media; rather, journalists and media figures should be allowed to craft the Code of Ethics with their own hands, free from any external pressures. We hope that the new Code of Ethics will make lawsuits and court cases a thing of the past and bring our nation closer to having what might be called a self-regulating media.

Q: Do you still maintain that you will be Egypt’s last minister of information? Will your job be redundant after you have overseen the changes that you want on the Egyptian media scene.

No, I have not changed my stance in this regard—this is truly my hope. Here we run the media of the people; our slogan is “Channel of the Egyptian People.” The pre-revolution media, however, was merely a mouthpiece for the single-party regime and did nothing to inform the people. We have made serious advances in allowing the media to encompass all walks of life, creating a media that advances the public interest of the nation, and commits to airing contrasting viewpoints. In Maspero today, we oversee 23 television channels and 58 radio stations, including 35 radio stations in 23 different languages that broadcast to countries in Africa, Asia and Europe. All of these media outlets speak on behalf of the people, and the opposition forces are given more representation than the ruling, pro-government forces. During the last 3 months, 65% of talk show guests represented the opposition, with the remainder being government supporters. This is part of the policy of airing both an opinion and its counter-opinion.

Q: In light of President Mursi’s rise to power and your subsequent appointment as minister of information, how many Maspero employees would you say are affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood?

I am from the Muslim Brotherhood, and I am proud to be affiliated with the Brotherhood—but I take off my Brotherhood hat at Maspero’s doors. You are well aware that Maspero was kept under close watch by the office of the President from 1952 until 2011. Thorough background checks were conducted on its employees, and anyone with ties to an Islamist movement was banned from entering Maspero, including Brotherhood members. I personally only entered Maspero after the revolution, even though I had been a member of ERTU, and I had never previously appeared on Egyptian television. I had been the media adviser to President Mursi’s campaign, and on the eve of his electoral victory, I came here to debate with Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim. That was the first time that I ever set foot in Maspero.

Q: How many female broadcasters wear the hijab today?

Only until after the revolution did a broadcaster wearing the hijab appear on Egyptian television. Prior to this, anyone who appeared with a beard brought doubt and suspicion upon himself. Even wearing a simple hijab could expose one to abuse. Before the revolution, Ghada Farouk had been a broadcaster for the Nile News channel. She had worked there since it was founded in 1998, and in 2001, after having worked there for three years, she decided to wear the hijab. Because of this, they relocated her to a position behind the camera. Post-revolution, Nermin Bitar—the daughter of media mogul Kamil Bitar, one of the founders of the Voice of the Arabs radio service—decided to start wearing the hijab. Despite the revolution’s demands for justice, dignity and citizens’ rights, they also forced her off-camera. As soon as I took over the ministry, I allowed these female colleagues to appear on-camera wearing the hijab, and some of them returned to their original posts. The number today stands at about ten news broadcasters, which is thanks to God almighty.

Q: What is your take on the Islamists’ siege of the Media Production City (MPC)? How do you account for your decision to send cameras to provide coverage of these events?

I sent cameras to MPC, just as I sent cameras to the Constitutional Court, the Office of the Attorney General and the Presidential Palace. I demanded that the demonstrators stay away from the MPC entry and exit points and that they demonstrate peacefully. The right to assemble is a guaranteed right, and protesting the content of some media channels ought to take place through legal means. The Media Free Zone does not ignore comments from citizens or public and private bodies. Sending cameras to cover the demonstrations was first and foremost a professional decision. At the same time, we condemn the besieging of any institution, because there are legal means available and official complaints can be filed if there is a violation of the Media Code of Ethics. We call on the media to work within a professional framework.

Egypt is a great country and it cannot be brought down by mere words. We are striving to promote a message of national unity and to avoid dissension and discord. We want a media that solves problems, not creates even greater ones. There are highly effective accountability mechanisms in place. The process starts with a notification, followed by investigation and punishment; if required, the program, or even the entire channel, can be taken off air, similar to what happened with Al-Fara’een TV. In this case, what is the justification for besieging MPC or demanding that channels based there be taken off the air? I support the right to protest as long as protestors keep their distance from the entrance points and do not disrupt production. Billions are being invested, and as I have stated before, EGP 6 billion was spent on private media last year with only EGP 1.5 billion of revenue to show for it. Thus, there is a gap; political money flows into private media. There is a gap of EGP 4.5 billion, and we do not know who paid the difference.

Q: So how are these private channels being financed?

They are financed by members of the former regime, from within Egypt and abroad, by businessmen and political parties, and by some who have political agendas they want to impose on Egypt. There are broadcasters whose salaries are twice as much as that of the president of the United States. Some broadcasters earn EGP 18 million per year, while others make EGP 14 million, or EGP 12 million. We also have broadcasters who receive more humble salaries despite their high levels of professionalism. Thus, there is a gap—and again I must stress that political money is flowing into private media. Some working in the media depend on the successes of the current government, which inherited heavy burdens and major crises from the former regime. It is working day and night to resolve these and meet the demands of the people.

Q: What is your stance on Bassem Youssef, the TV comedian who has been arrested on charges of maligning Islam and President Mursi? Do you support the charges that have been leveled against him?

I do not want Bassem Youssef to appear in court. As you already know, I support a self-regulating media, which should be able to render judgment. This could take place by way of media veterans overseeing the affairs of a self-regulating media, say, by way of a national body. This would set the profession’s rules and regulations and hold people accountable for any lapses in professionalism. This body has yet to be established but it could look to the Media Free Zone, which already has rules and regulations that dictate how to handle violations. There is also the Egyptian Satellites Company that can also be held accountable. There are many private media outlets that do not tell the truth. As Minister of Justice Ahmed Mekki previously stated, the government is treated unfairly because it works tirelessly but it only ever receives negative press. Its achievements are ignored.

Q: In your opinion, what is the underlying cause for the general public’s ambivalence towards President Mursi?

Since Mursi’s election, significant domestic and foreign capital has been poured into weakening the reputation of the state and toppling the president. Attempts have been made to show that the president has not kept his campaign promises. Even on the first day he took office, the so-called Mursi Meter website was launched to measure the progress made in the five issues on which the president based his platform: fuel, security, traffic, bread and cleanliness.

Q: When the president says he will “cut off any finger that meddles in Egypt,” do these fingers belong to Egyptian nationals or foreigners?

They are from abroad. The meddling fingers from within Egypt must be held accountable and contained. As I told my friends, the few thousands that wager that the president will be overthrown and take to the streets to protest here and there are delusional. The president’s supporters are many times greater than these few thousand. [Protests are] not the proper mechanism for bringing down a political leader. The proper mechanism is the ballot box; the same mechanism that brought the president to power. We, as a country, chose this course via the ballot box; this reflects the will of the people. Everyone must be patient with President Mursi and give him time. If he succeeds, then we will re-elect him. If he fails, then the people will choose. As I told my friends, you are deluding yourselves if you think that the president will be toppled by demonstrations, even if there are millions of Egyptian pounds being spent—from home and abroad—to this end.

Q: Are there any plans to privatize television channels being broadcast from Maspero?

We have always denied such rumors. We have received many inquiries regarding purchasing broadcasting stations from various Arab and international organizations. Some Arab organizations wanted to buy radio frequencies, but we refused. We have no intention to sell any channel or radio station. We do not have any extra to rent or sell. The same goes for the regional channels. We are already working to develop these channels, because they have an indispensable role to play in local community development. We want to utilize these channels and develop them.

Q: How many employees work at Maspero? What is the minister’s average expenditure?

We have 43,000 employees. Problems arise from the wages, benefits and salaries paid to this staff, which amount to approximately EGP 270 million per month. From the beginning, we undertook a project to reduce expenses. I have put spending limits in place. Last month, these expenses were EGP 208 million, whereas this month, payroll expenses decreased to EGP 198 million; however, they are likely to rise next month. I am also committed to an open door policy in that I listen to employee complaints. A delegation from Nile News came to my office recently, and just today I met with a number of colleagues regarding creating a new radio station that will be called Radio of the People. It will provide up-to-the-minute reporting on news, traffic and the economy. This comes after the great success we had with Radio Egypt.

The Ministry of Information prepared a report during my first 200 days, and it referenced my success in saving the ministry EGP 186 million in expenses, producing revenues of EGP 89 million in advertising, and achieving sales of EGP 52 million from dramas. Studio 5 has been completed and it is the largest studio in the Arab region. The privately owned Studio 21 was established for the Egyptian satellite channel at a cost of EGP 16 million. In addition, a digital broadcast archive was set up at a cost of EGP 15 million. I am currently working on setting up three television studios overlooking the Nile on the tenth floor, which will be operational in a matter of weeks. This will allow us to dispense with the leased spaces in MPC.

Q: As a Brotherhood (Ikhwan) member, what is your response to the rumors that the Brotherhood is seeking to Ikwanize society at large?

The government has 35 ministries, seven of which are affiliated with the Freedom and Justice Party, which is the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, 20% of ministers are affiliated with the Brotherhood, and they entered the government based on their reputations as technocrats. Al-Wasat Party has a minister, as do other parties. The whole Egyptian spectrum is represented in this government: liberals, nationalists and Islamists. However, not a single one became minister because of his political affiliations, but rather because of his experience and technocratic background. The allegations of the “Ikhwanization of the state” are blatant lies created by the president’s enemies. They undermine all of his attempts to fulfill his campaign pledges.

Q: What is your assessment of the leaders of the National Salvation Front’s refusal to enter into dialogue with President Mursi, despite his persistent calls to do so?

They do not want to enter into dialogue because they fear dialogue. They fear the ballot box. Unfortunately, some circles from abroad support them. Some Western circles do not want us to use certain democratic mechanisms in our country. They do not want to concede the right to rule to those who won at the ballot box. Some have given up this stance and call for incorporating everyone, but if everyone participates, then there is no platform or identity. The platform that the people chose must be given a chance to be implemented so that it can become a tangible reality on the ground. If the government has made mistakes, we must criticize and expose them.

Q: When did you last meet with President Mursi?

About a month ago. President Mohamed Mursi is a very busy man. He bears the burdens of many people, and we pray that God aids him. The president has no directives regarding the media. He personally wants the media to be the eyes of the people, evaluating him and his government’s performance.

Q: How has your life changed since becoming information minister?

This position has ended my social life. We ask God to bless our time, and that he guide our affairs and our families. We ask God Almighty for blessings. I believe that despite the difficulties, the country is progressing. All members of the government are working hard. Egypt is safeguarded by God Almighty, and we will succeed in passing through this ordeal, like many other countries before us.